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HYDE-CARE FOR ALL: THE EXPANSION OF
ABORTION-FUNDING RESTRICTIONS
UNDER HEALTH CARE REFORM
Cynthia Soohoo†
I would certainly like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody hav-
ing an abortion, a rich woman, a middle class woman, or a poor
woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the [Medi-
caid] bill.
Representative Henry Hyde (1977)1
My hope for the next phase of the movement for procreative
and sexual rights is that we not limit ourselves simply to winning
back what we have lost, but rather set our sights on winning
what we need: recognition of an affirmative right of self-determi-
nation . . . . This will . . . require recognizing that it is society’s
responsibility both to protect choice and to provide the material
and social conditions that render choice a meaningful right
rather than a mere privilege.
Rhonda Copelon (1991)2
The historic health care reform law passed in 2010 has the
potential to dramatically increase the number of Americans able to
access health care. Health care reform is projected to result in
health care coverage for thirty million Americans who are currently
uninsured.3 While increasing health coverage is a good thing,
† Director of the International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, CUNY School of
Law. The author is grateful to Ruthann Robson, Brigitte Amiri, Jordan Goldberg, Di-
ana Hortsch, Suzannah Phillips, Payal Shah, and Stephanie Toti for their thoughtful
comments and suggestions, to Mónica Roa for her insights on Colombian law, to
Claire Cooper for her excellent research assistance, and to the participants in the
South Asia Reproductive Rights Case Development Workshop, hosted by the Center
for Reproductive Rights’ South Asia Reproductive Justice and Accountability Initiative
(“SARJAI”) for their insights into South Asian case law. Research for this Article was
funded in part by a PSC-CUNY Research Award.
1 FREDERICK S. JAFFE ET AL., ABORTION POLITICS: PRIVATE MORALITY AND PUBLIC
POLICY 127 (1981) (quoting Representative Henry Hyde).
2 Rhonda Copelon, Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building Sexual and Repro-
ductive Freedom, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 15, 16 (1990–1991).
3 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE [CBO], ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECI-
SION 13, tbl. 1 (2012), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf. The CBO estimates a decrease
in the number of uninsured to fourteen million by 2014 and thirty million by 2022.
Id.
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health care reform will also dramatically increase the impact that
the government will have on the provision of health care. The law
achieves broader health care coverage by increasing the number of
people covered by Medicaid and creating state insurance ex-
changes that allow individuals to buy health insurance with pre-
mium and cost-sharing credits.4 The federal government will set
minimum requirements for policies sold on the exchanges, and
state governments will have significant power to dictate policy re-
quirements and exclusions. This expansion of government influ-
ence over health care can be dangerous if government policies are
driven by politics instead of medicine and if no legal or political
constraints are imposed to protect individual rights. Nowhere is
this danger more pronounced than in government policies around
reproductive health and abortion.
Since the 1980 case Harris v. McRae, the Supreme Court has
held that it is constitutional for the federal government to use its
funding of health care services to dissuade women who rely on gov-
ernment health services from having abortions. Under the federal
Hyde Amendment, Congress has prohibited the use of federal
Medicaid funds to pay for abortion care even where a woman re-
quires an abortion for health reasons since 1976. Over the past
thirty-five years, similar restrictions have been imposed on other
groups that rely on the federal government for health care, includ-
ing federal employees and military personnel and their depen-
dents, Native Americans who rely on the Indian Health Services for
medical care, Peace Corps volunteers, adolescents covered by the
Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”), and women in
prison.5 The Supreme Court also expanded Harris’s holding to fed-
eral funding in other contexts, upholding laws prohibiting the use
of public health facilities or employees in the provision of abortion
services and restrictions prohibiting recipients of federal family
planning funds from providing counseling or referrals for
abortion.6
During the 2009 debates around health care reform, anti-
4 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF THE HEALTH CARE LAW 1
(2010).
5 JESSICA ARONS & MADINA AGÉNOR. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SEPARATE AND UNE-
QUAL: THE HYDE AMENDMENT AND WOMEN OF COLOR 8–9 (2010), available at http://
www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/12/pdf/hyde_amend
ment.pdf; Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter: Public Funding of Abortion for
Poor Women in the United States, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. No. 1 (Winter 2007), avail-
able at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/1/gpr100112.pdf.
6 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989).
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choice legislators sought to use health care reform to expand the
reach of abortion funding restrictions even further by arguing that
because some policies offered on the new state insurance ex-
changes would receive government subsidies, the federal “policy”
prohibiting public abortion funding required that exchange poli-
cies ban abortion coverage. Rather than questioning the underly-
ing logic of prohibiting federal health care funding for medically
necessary abortions, President Obama and supporters of health
care reform accepted the Hyde Amendment as the starting point
for the debate. In the end, congressional democrats brokered a
compromise to defeat proposals to ban exchange polices from cov-
ering abortion by creating a complicated accounting procedure to
segregate federal subsidies from individual premiums and to only
use funds derived from individual premiums “to pay for” abortion
care.
However, the political debate took its toll. Now, as we wait for
the implementation of health care reform, we are poised to see the
Hyde Amendment’s impact dramatically expand. Ironically, the
historic extension of health care coverage could result in the larg-
est expansion of abortion funding restrictions since the amend-
ment went into effect in 1977.7 In addition to a dramatic increase
of the number of women covered by Medicaid, we are seeing state
legislative attempts to force the same coverage restrictions upon
women who buy their own health insurance on the private market
or through the new health care exchanges. These measures were
explicitly sanctioned and indirectly encouraged by federal health
care reform. The health care reform legislation provides that states
may prohibit abortion coverage in the policies offered on their in-
surance exchanges. Even though the exchanges do not go into ef-
fect until 2014, over a third of states have already passed laws to
7 Rachel Benson Gold, Insurance Coverage and Abortion Incidence: Information and
Misinformation, 13 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. No. 4, 8–9 (Fall 2010), available at http://
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/13/4/gpr130407.pdf. The Gold report, issued prior
to the Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebe-
lius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), noted that because the Affordable Care Act’s proposed
Medicaid expansion would dramatically expand the overall Medicaid program and
the effect of the expansion would be “felt disproportionately in states that do not
subsidize abortion with their own funds” health care reform posed the “largest expan-
sion of abortion funding restrictions since Hyde was first implemented.” Id. Following
the Supreme Court’s holding in Sebelius that states can opt out of the Medicaid expan-
sion without penalty; it is unclear exactly how great the Medicaid expansion will be.
Id. It is also unknown whether the states that participate in the Medicaid expansion
are likely to be states that use state funds to pay for medically necessary abortions.
However, the increase in the number of women subject to abortion funding restric-
tions is likely to be substantial.
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ban abortion coverage on their exchanges.8 Further, by incorporat-
ing requirements that segregate federal funds so that they are not
mixed with insurance premiums that are used to pay for abortion
services, the health reform law has encouraged the idea that those
who pay insurance premiums should have the right to dictate how
insurance companies use the money paid to them. Several states
have taken this to the extreme by passing bans on all private insur-
ance coverage for abortion care, irrespective of whether policies
are sold on their exchange, arguing that individual insurance buy-
ers may not want their premiums used to pay for abortions. States
have also sought to use the withdrawal of funding to punish health
care providers associated with abortion by adopting measures to
cut Planned Parenthood funding.9
While opponents of health care might argue that this type of
overreaching is precisely why government should not be involved
in the provision of health care coverage, the proper response is not
to double-down on a negative rights paradigm that only protects
women’s right to be free from undue government interference. In-
stead, I argue that the Supreme Court made a wrong turn in 1980
when it held that the government could use its funding of health
care services for the poor to further an anti-choice agenda based
on a formalistic distinction between government-imposed obstacles
and government exercise of its discretion to make funding choices
to further its policy objectives.
In the wake of Harris v. McRae, progressive scholars and repro-
ductive justice activists articulated the need for an affirmative con-
cept of reproductive autonomy, which requires that government
policies and programs actively support, rather than undermine the
exercise of fundamental rights. Although Supreme Court decisions
post-Harris have only reinforced the concept of reproductive free-
dom as a negative right, the concept that privacy and autonomy
rights include affirmative government obligations has found sup-
port in international human rights law and in the decisions of high
courts in other countries.10 Further, as illustrated by state court
cases holding that abortion funding restrictions violate fundamen-
tal rights protected by state constitutions, there is substantial sup-
port for construing even a negative privacy right to prohibit
discriminatory government benefit programs that seek to coerce
women’s constitutional choices.
8 See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 147 and 153 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 36–40 and Parts IV.A, C.
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The first part of this Article examines critiques of the develop-
ment of reproductive autonomy as a negative privacy right and ar-
guments made by progressive scholars and the reproductive justice
movement to adopt an affirmative right to reproductive autonomy.
The second part looks at the Supreme Court’s abortion funding
cases from 1977 to 1980 and a related set of cases concerning
prohibitions on the use of public medical facilities or staff to per-
form abortions and the prohibition of federal funding to organiza-
tions that provide or refer women to doctors or organizations that
provide abortion services. These decisions allowed the federal and
state governments to use their funding programs to impose sub-
stantial obstacles in the path of women seeking access to abortion
care. The third part examines how the Hyde Amendment restric-
tions have been expanded by recent laws banning insurance cover-
age for abortion care on state insurance exchanges and in the
private market and funding restrictions targeting Planned
Parenthood. The fourth part of this Article looks at alternative ways
of analyzing public and private health insurance restrictions on
abortion coverage by considering state court cases, international
law, and the decisions of high courts in Canada, Colombia, and
Nepal.
I. AN AFFIRMATIVE VISION OF REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH AND AUTONOMY
In April 1980, eight years after the Supreme Court decided Roe
v. Wade,11 Professor Rhonda Copelon appeared before the Court
to argue the abortion funding case Harris v. McRae. Following Roe,
the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions applying Roe’s
strict scrutiny standard to invalidate abortion restrictions.12 The ex-
ceptions to this string of victories were two 1977 cases, Beal v. Doe13
and Maher v. Roe,14 which held that states were not obligated to
cover non-therapeutic abortions—abortions that are not necessary
11 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12 Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 324 & n. 32 (2006) (noting that with the excep-
tion of funding cases, the Supreme Court applied Roe’s strict scrutiny standard to
strike down most abortion restrictions until 1989); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 430 (17th ed. 2007) (“As to adult women, restrictions
on public subsidies were the only abortion regulations upheld in the period between
Roe and Casey.”).
13 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
14 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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for health reasons—under state Medicaid programs.15
Although the Supreme Court had upheld state restrictions
prohibiting Medicaid funding for non-therapeutic abortion, there
was significant reason to think that the Court could find Harris dis-
tinguishable. The federal funding restrictions in Harris went signifi-
cantly further than the state restrictions in Beal and Maher. In those
cases, the Supreme Court held that state regulations could limit
state Medicaid coverage to medically necessary abortions and pro-
hibit funding for abortions that were not needed for medical rea-
sons. The federal Hyde Amendment at issue in Harris prohibited
the use of federal Medicaid funds to cover medically necessary
abortions, only allowing coverage where an abortion was required
because a woman’s life was endangered or if the pregnancy re-
sulted from rape or incest.16
The Harris majority rejected due process, equal protection, Es-
tablishment Clause, and statutory challenges to the discriminatory
funding scheme and upheld the Hyde Amendment. Although the
abortion funding cases were a setback for reproductive rights activ-
ists, the decisions were widely understood as turning on the distinc-
tion between government restrictions and government failure to
fund. Thus, the government’s decision not to fund an activity was
not viewed as an overall threat to women’s constitutional right to
abortion services.17
However, Copelon did not underestimate the significance of
the abortion funding cases, writing in 1991 that the decisions
turned the right articulated in Roe v. Wade into “the right to be free
of barriers to abortion interposed by the state.”18 She lamented
that “[t]he divergence between the right to abortion and the real-
ity of access transformed abortion from a privacy right into a privi-
lege.”19 Copelon also criticized the “pro-choice” movement for
failing to recognize how Harris undermined core principles of Roe.
15 Maher, 432 U.S. at 465–66, 469. In Maher, the Supreme Court rejected constitu-
tional challenges to state exclusions of nontherapeutic abortions, and in Beal, it re-
jected statutory claims under Title XIX, which sets forth federal requirements for
state programs. Id.
16 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1980). Since 1976, the Hyde Amend-
ment has passed as an amendment to the annual appropriations bill or as a joint
resolution. The original Hyde Amendment did not include an exception for rape or
incest. Id.
17 See Wharton et al., supra note 12, at 324 (writing that most abortion restrictions
were struck down under Roe’s strict scrutiny standard until the “constitutional tide”
turned in 1989).
18 Copelon, supra note 2, at 17.
19 Id. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 384 (1985) (stating that after Harris the Court was
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She suggested that the failure of middle class women to fight
against restrictions that undermined poor women’s access to ser-
vices opened the door to increasing abortion restrictions intro-
duced in the late 1980s and early 1990s:
Indeed, there can be no clearer example of the principle that
no right is secure if it is not secure for everybody. Had more
privileged women poured out in opposition to the cutbacks on
Medicaid . . . , there might be less question today about the se-
curity of the right to abortion, the funding of abortions, or the
Bill of Rights itself. While many pro-choice and feminist organi-
zations did vigorously oppose the Medicaid cutoffs, the fact that
Medicaid was an issue of poor people’s rights severely narrowed
the base of support and the scope of outreach efforts directed
toward a significantly libertarian constituency for reproductive
choice.20
In a 1991 article, Copelon discussed the tension between the
liberal notion of privacy “characterized as the negative and quali-
fied right to be left alone” and “the more radical ideal of privacy,
depicted as the positive liberty of self-determination and equal per-
sonhood.”21 She wrote that the negative theory of privacy is prob-
lematic because it assumes that if the government does not impose
any interference with a woman’s reproductive autonomy and
health, she is free to exercise her choice and any failure to effectu-
ate her choice results from her own failure.22 This theory fails to
recognize the role that social conditions play and the state’s role in
creating those conditions.23 It also denies any public responsibility
for ensuring that individuals are able to exercise autonomy.24 In
fact, as discussed below,25 the Supreme Court has interpreted the
negative concept of privacy to allow the state to condition health
care benefits upon a woman opting to continue pregnancy rather
than obtain an abortion even if the pregnancy endangers her
health.
A. The Reproductive Justice Movement
In the 1990s, women of color activists articulated similar and
broader concerns about the mainstream pro-choice movement.
accused of sensitivity to only the Justices’ “own social milieu—‘of creating a middle
class right to abortion’”).
20 Copelon, supra note 2, at 22.
21 Id. at 41.
22 Id. at 46.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 44, 47.
25 See infra Part II.A-C.
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They questioned the movement’s over-reliance on legal rights and
strategies, given the cramped constitutional vision articulated by
the Supreme Court and the consistent failure of legal recognition
of reproductive rights to translate to actual access for low-income
women.26 Activists involved in what would become the reproduc-
tive justice movement called out reproductive rights activists for
failing to see the racial implications of reproductive health laws
and policies and for only focusing on issues that affect white mid-
dle class women. In particular, the reproductive justice movement
criticized the pro-choice movement for focusing too narrowly on
the legal right to abortion and for failing to address laws and poli-
cies that undermine the choice of women of color to have chil-
dren.27 Instead reproductive justice “emphasizes that women have
a right to have or not have children, as well as to parent the chil-
dren they have.”28
Significantly, reproductive justice scholars and activists con-
tend that full realization of reproductive rights requires more than
a negative privacy right. A reproductive justice analysis “recognizes
that ‘enabling conditions’ are necessary to realize these rights.”29
Thus, reproductive justice requires the recognition of an affirma-
tive government duty “to facilitate the processes of choice and self-
determination.”30
Reproductive justice activists also have been critical of the re-
productive rights movement’s overreliance on litigation strategies
26 Sarah London, Reproductive Justice: Developing A Lawyering Model, 13 BERKELEY J.
AFR.–AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 77 (2011).
27 Id. at 75.
28 Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human Rights Change Home,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 497 (2008) (citing Loretta Ross, Understanding Reproductive
Justice 1–2 (2006) (unpublished paper, on file with author)).
29 Id.
30 DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 309 (1997). See Timothy Zick, Re-Defining Reproductive Freedom:
Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 327, 331 (1998); Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionaliz-
ing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1403 (2009) (writing that “what the Court cre-
ated in [Roe] is not a right to legal abortion; it is a negative right against the
criminalization of abortion in some circumstances . . . . To be a meaningful support
for women’s equality or liberty, a right to legal abortion must mean much more than
a right to be free of moralistic legislation that interferes with a contractual right to
purchase one. It must guarantee access to one.”); London, supra note 26, at 71 (not-
ing that the “mainstream reproductive rights movement has historically dodged the
question of public resources” in contrast with the reproductive justice movement
which “refuses to ignore the question of public resources—recognizing that a legal
right to reproductive services, without support, leaves many women without meaning-
ful choice.”).
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because they are ill equipped to address barriers to access or create
the political pressure needed to catalyze the adoption of laws and
policies to support women’s reproductive autonomy. They argue
that by defining problems in legal terms, the reproductive rights
movement has marginalized issues that cannot be expressed in the
existing rights framework and has concentrated the movement’s
leadership in the legal elite rather than in communities.31 Because
the right to abortion as constitutionalized by the Supreme Court is
essentially a negative right, feminist scholar Robin West concurs
that it is too narrow to address the concerns and demands of the
reproductive justice movement.32 Because “the Court has consist-
ently read the Constitution as not including positive rights” and it
“is so unlikely as to be a certainty that [the Court] will commence a
jurisprudence of positive constitutional rights, by beginning [with]
mandating public funds for abortion,” she contends that the right
to abortion might be better secured through political or legislative
victories than through a strategy that relies on rights adjudicated
by the courts.33
While the reproductive justice movement accurately critiques
reproductive rights strategies that have resulted in a disproportion-
ate focus on lawyers and courts, crowding out other strategies, fora
and actors,34 it may be too quick to dismiss rights arguments. Al-
though the Supreme Court has consistently refused to recognize
affirmative government obligations to ensure rights, human rights
bodies are increasingly recognizing a broader conception of rights
that require the state to take steps to enable individuals to exercise
their fundamental rights.
B. Human Rights Standards
As the struggle for reproductive rights in the United States led
women of color and progressive scholars like Copelon and West to
articulate an alternative affirmative vision of women’s reproductive
rights, the international human rights community began to de-
velop the concept that governments have obligations to ensure as
well as respect fundamental rights. In the last twenty years, interna-
tional human rights law and the decisions of high courts from
many countries have begun to articulate a methodology for enforc-
31 London, supra note 26, at 85–86.
32 West, supra note 30, at 1403–404.
33 Id.
34 London, supra note 26, at 85.
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ing affirmative obligations.35 Although the majority of scholarship
and decisions around affirmative government obligations has fo-
cused on socio-economic rights, there is growing recognition that
civil and political rights often require the development of govern-
ment programs and expenditures.36
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”) requires parties to the treaty to “respect and to ensure”
the rights set forth in the treaty.37 The U.N. Human Rights Com-
mittee, which monitors implementation of the ICCPR, has inter-
preted the treaty to encompass both negative and positive
obligations.38 In particular, it has stated that ratifying countries
should “adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and
other appropriate measures in order to fulfill their legal obliga-
tions” under the treaty.39 The South African Constitution similarly
provides that the state “must respect, protect, promote and fulfill
the rights in the Bill of Rights.”40
These dialogues among human rights activists, progressive
feminist scholars, and women of color activists nurtured and
strengthened each other. After Harris v. McRae, Copelon became a
leading international women’s human rights scholar. In the 1990s,
she and other feminist scholars and activists worked to transform
the international human rights movement to ensure that human
rights law reflected the concerns of women and to address human
rights violations committed against them. One of their key accom-
35 Comm. on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights [CESCR], General Comment
No. 3, The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant),
U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/4538838e10.html. See also Malcolm Langford, The Justiciability of Social Rights:
From Practice to Theory, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 3, 22–24 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008).
36 Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of Our Rights: The Right
to Health in State Constitutions, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1006–1007 (2010). See, e.g.,
Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 305, 315 (1979) (holding that the right to a
fair and public hearing requires access to counsel in civil cases).
37 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html. See
Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 36, at 1011; Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Frame-
work of International Human Rights: A Source of Social Justice in the U.S., 3 N.Y. CITY L.
REV. 59, 65–66 (1998).
38 See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 [80], The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/docid/478b26ae2.html (“The legal obligation under article 2, paragraph 1, is
both negative and positive in nature.”).
39 Id. at ¶ 7.
40 S. AFR. CONST. § 7(2), 1996, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
3ae6b5de4.html.
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plishments was the recognition of reproductive rights as human
rights at the International Conference on Population and Develop-
ment (“ICPD”) in Cairo in 1994. Members of the U.S. black wo-
men’s caucus attended the ICPD and were inspired by the ways in
which the human rights concepts developed by international activ-
ists addressed the very concerns they were struggling with at
home.41 Following the conference, Sistersong, a leading reproduc-
tive justice organization, embraced a human rights framework for
its work, explaining that “[h]uman rights provides more possibili-
ties for our struggles than the privacy concepts the pro-choice
movement claims only using the U.S. Constitution.”42
II. THE ROAD WE TRAVELED: U.S. ABORTION FUNDING CASES
In the 1970s, when attempts to directly challenge Roe in the
courts or by a proposed constitutional amendment failed, anti-
choice legislators targeted abortion funding as an alternative strat-
egy.43 Their attention turned to the Medicaid program, which pro-
vides public health care funding for the poor. Medicaid is
administered by the states, but in order to receive partial federal
reimbursement for costs, states must abide by certain federal re-
quirements set out in Title XIX of the Social Security Act.44 After
Roe v. Wade struck down criminal restrictions on abortion in 1973,
abortion care was routinely covered by most state Medicaid pro-
grams.45 In 1977, before the Hyde Amendment went into effect,
41 Why is Reproductive Justice Important for Women of Color?, SISTERSONG, available at
http://www.sistersong.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&
Itemid=81 (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
42 Id.
43 JAFFE ET AL., supra note 1, at 128.
44 CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, WHOSE CHOICE: HOW THE HYDE AMENDMENT HARMS
POOR WOMEN 18 [hereinafter WHOSE CHOICE], available at http://reproductiverights.
org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Hyde_Report_FINAL_nospreads.pdf;
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980); Women of the State of Minn. by Doe v.
Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. 1995). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2010) (establishing
the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission).
45 JAFFE ET AL., supra note 1, at 128. See, e.g., Comm. To Defend Reprod. Rights v.
Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 782 (Cal. 1981) (noting that prior to legislation passed in 1978,
Medi-Cal paid for abortions obtained by Medi-Cal recipients); Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 928 (N.J. 1982) (“In the three years between the Roe v. Wade
decision and the enactment of [state legislation] in 1975, New Jersey did not restrict
state Medicaid funding for abortion.”); Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 23 (stating that within
months of Roe, Minnesota’s policy was to reimburse for all abortions performed by a
licensed provider); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 135–136 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1986) (ex-
plaining that shortly after Roe, Connecticut provided coverage for therapeutic
abortions).
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Medicaid funded almost a quarter of the abortions in the United
States.46
Congressional attempts to prevent Medicaid coverage for
abortion care began as early as 1973, but initially were unsuccess-
ful. Although then-Congressman Henry Hyde saw Medicaid fund-
ing as a potentially powerful weapon to prevent abortions,47 even
members of his own ranks expressed concern that the restrictions
discriminated against the poor. The pro-life Chair of the Labor-
Health Education and Welfare Appropriations Committee de-
nounced Hyde’s proposal as “blatantly” discriminatory:
It does not prohibit abortion. It prohibits abortion for poor peo-
ple . . . . To accept the right of this country to impose on its poor
citizens . . . a morality which it is not willing to impose on the
rich as well—we would not dare do that. This is what this
amendment does . . . .  It is a vote against the poor people.48
Despite the concerns expressed about denying abortion cover-
age for low-income women, between 1973–75 several states im-
posed restrictions on abortion coverage in their state programs.49
In 1976, Congress passed the Hyde Amendment as an amendment
to the annual appropriations bill for the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. The amendment prohibited the use of
federal funds to pay for an abortion unless a woman’s life was en-
dangered. Subsequent versions of the Hyde Amendment added an
exception for victims of rape or incest.50
The state and federal funding restrictions were quickly chal-
lenged. The Supreme Court’s “abortion funding cases” Beal v.
Doe,51 Maher v. Roe,52 and Harris v. McRae53 were decided from
1977–80. Beal and Maher both involved challenges to state Medi-
46 JAFFE ET AL., supra note 1, at 128. Although the Hyde Amendment passed in
1976, it was enjoined until 1977. Id. at 129.
47 Id. at 127 (quoting Representative Henry Hyde). During the debate, Hyde made
his intention to use Medicaid funding to prevent women from choosing abortions
and his indifference to the plight of poor women clear, stating “I would certainly like
to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a middle
class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the [Medi-
caid] bill.” Id.
48 Id. at 128 (quoting Representative Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania).
49 Id. at 132. From 1973–75 prior to the Hyde Amendment, thirteen states insti-
tuted restrictions on Medicaid abortion funding; federal courts threw out most of
these restrictions. Id. By the end of 1979, forty states had moved to restrict Medicaid
funding. Id.
50 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980). Since 1976, Congress has passed the
Hyde Amendment every year as an appropriations rider or by joint resolution. Id.
51 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
52 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
53 Harris, 448 U.S. 297.
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caid laws that prohibited coverage for an abortion unless it was nec-
essary to preserve a woman’s health. Harris challenged the Hyde
Amendment. As described in the next section, in the three cases
the Supreme Court rejected statutory challenges and constitutional
arguments that the funding restrictions were unconstitutional.
After getting the green light from the Supreme Court in Har-
ris, the federal government began to extend similar abortion re-
strictions to other groups that rely on the federal government for
health coverage.54 New restrictions that expanded the use of gov-
ernment funding as a tool to discourage abortion beyond women
who rely on the government for health care coverage were also
introduced. Although these restrictions, which included prohibi-
tions on the use of government facilities to perform abortions and
restrictions on the activities of programs that received federal
funds, created obstacles that were distinguishable from govern-
ment refusal to fund abortions, the Supreme Court extended the
line of the abortion funding cases to find such restrictions constitu-
tional as well.55
A. Medicaid Exclusion of Non-Medically Necessary Abortions
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving state
laws prohibiting Medicaid coverage for non-medically necessary
abortions. Beal v. Doe challenged a Pennsylvania regulation requir-
ing that three doctors certify that an abortion was medically neces-
sary in order for a Medicaid recipient to receive coverage.56 Maher
v. Roe challenged a Connecticut regulation that limited Medicaid
coverage to “medically necessary” abortions by requiring a certifi-
cate of medical necessity from the attending physician.57 The Su-
preme Court considered and rejected statutory arguments in Beal58
and held that the restrictions were not unconstitutional in Maher.
In Beal, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
that the Pennsylvania regulation was inconsistent with the purpose
of Title XIX.59 Because the regulation only prohibited non-thera-
peutic abortions, the Court wrote, “[I]t is hardly inconsistent with
the objectives of the Act for a State to refuse to fund unnecessary
54 See infra Part II.C.
55 See infra Part II.A-C.
56 Beal, 432 U.S. 438.
57 Maher, 432 U.S. at 466.
58 Beal, 432 U.S. at 443. The Third Circuit struck down the regulation on statutory
grounds and did not reach the plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments. Id.
59 Id. at 444.
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though perhaps desirable medical services.”60 The Court specifi-
cally distinguished the non-therapeutic abortions barred by the
regulations from medically necessary abortions.61 The Court wrote
that “serious statutory questions might be presented if a state Medi-
caid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from its
coverage.”62
In Maher v. Roe, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional
challenges to the Connecticut regulation. The Court avoided ap-
plying strict scrutiny to the regulation by declining to construe the
discriminatory funding scheme as state interference with a wo-
man’s constitutional rights. The Court’s analysis began by distin-
guishing the funding scheme from abortion restrictions that were
struck down in its earlier cases. The Court noted that Roe involved
a criminal restriction on abortion and that other impermissible re-
strictions, such as a spousal consent law that imposed an “absolute
obstacle to a woman’s decision,” were “different in form but similar
in effect.”63
The Court distinguished the funding scheme from prior im-
permissible obstacles. In fact, it found that the scheme did not cre-
ate any new obstacle for a poor woman who seeks an abortion.
Based on the assertion that “[t]he Constitution imposes no obliga-
tion on the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses
of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses
of indigents,”64 it held that
The Connecticut regulation . . . is different in kind from the
laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. The . . . reg-
ulation places no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the preg-
nant woman’s path to an abortion. An indigent woman who
desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of
Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she continues as
60 Id. at 444–45.
61 Id. at 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While it is important to distinguish between
therapeutic abortions—abortions that are required because pregnancy risks a wo-
man’s health—and non-therapeutic abortions, Justice Brennan argued in dissent that
all abortions are medically necessary. He wrote: “Pregnancy is unquestionably a condi-
tion requiring medical services . . . . Treatment for the condition may involve medical
procedures for its termination, or medical procedures to bring the pregnancy to
term, resulting in a live birth . . .. [A]bortion and childbirth, when stripped of the
sensitive moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply two alter-
native medical methods of dealing with pregnancy . . . .’” Id..
62 Id. at 444.
63 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977).
64 Id. at 469. The Court claimed to recognize the “plight of an indigent women
who desires an abortion” but suggested that constitutional protections cannot be ac-
corded for “every social and economic ill.” Id. at 479.
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before to be dependent on private sources for the service she
desires.65
In addition to holding that the funding scheme did not pose
an obstacle to a poor woman seeking an abortion, the Court also
suggested that it was within the state’s legislative power to adopt
policies and allocate public funds in order to influence women’s
decision-making. The Court wrote that
[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alterna-
tive activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional con-
cerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by
force of law; the State’s power to encourage actions deemed to
be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.66
The Court’s conclusion that the state should be given more
leeway when it is affirmatively allocating resources as part of a gov-
ernment policy appears driven by institutional concerns67 rather
than by an analysis of the impact on a woman’s constitutional
rights. The Court wrote that the state should be given “wider lati-
tude in choosing among competing demands for limited public
funds,”68 and that the decision to expend state funds for non-medi-
cally necessary abortions “is fraught with judgments of policy and
value.” In such situations, “the appropriate forum for their resolu-
tion in a democracy is the legislature.”69
B. Medicaid Exclusion of Medically Necessary Abortions: Harris v.
McRae
Although Beal suggested that there were serious questions
about whether denial of coverage for medically necessary abortions
violated the purpose of Medicaid, the Harris majority sidestepped
any substantive discussion of the propriety of denying coverage for
a medically necessary service under a program designed to provide
health services for the poor. Because the government has no obli-
gation to fund health care for the poor, the Court took the posi-
tion that the scope of states’ obligation to fund medically necessary
services was defined by Congress and that Congress did not intend
Title XIX to require states to fund any service for which the federal
65 Id. at 474.
66 Id. at 475–76.
67 See Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 36, at 1008 (discussing legitimacy and com-
petency concerns that have led courts to refrain from enforcing socio-economic rights
that require judicial oversight of policy decisions).
68 Maher, 432 U.S. at 479.
69 Id.
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government withheld funding.70 After rejecting plaintiffs’ statutory
arguments, the Court relied on the distinction drawn between af-
firmative obligations and government-imposed obstacles in Maher
to reject plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.
The Court defined the liberty interest established by Roe as a
negative right71 to “protection against unwarranted government in-
terference . . . in the context of certain personal decisions.”72 It
explicitly rejected the idea that the state had any obligation to en-
sure that a woman be able to exercise her constitutional right to
abortion. It wrote “it simply does not follow that a woman’s free-
dom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the
financial resource to avail herself of the full range of protected
choices.”73
Although the government’s decision to fund all medical care
(including pre-natal care) other than medically necessary abor-
tions might impact a poor woman’s decision-making, the Court
held the government’s actions did not merit heightened scrutiny
because it identified poverty as the obstacle to her constitutional
right to decide to have an abortion rather than the discriminatory
funding scheme:
[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove
those not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter cate-
gory. The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s
ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected free-
dom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions
on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency. Although
Congress has opted to subsidize medically necessary services
generally, but not certain medically necessary abortions, . . . the
Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the
same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically
necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had cho-
sen to subsidize no health care costs at all.74
Although the Court relied heavily on the distinction between
state action and inaction, it acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ claim
was not merely a claim that the state failed to fund a benefit. Con-
gress’ refusal to fund medically necessary abortions was not driven
by a lack of resources or difficult choices about how to allocate
70 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309-10 (1980).
71 See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 384.
72 Harris, 448 U.S. at 317–18.
73 Id. at 316.
74 Id. at 316–17.
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resources amidst conflicting health care priorities. Instead, the
Court recognized that the state sought to influence a woman’s de-
cision-making process through its selective allocation of resources.
Citing Maher, the Court again asserted that Congress is entitled to a
degree of deference in making funding determinations.75 The
Court wrote that the constitutional freedom recognized in Roe v.
Wade “did not prevent [the state] from making ‘a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement[ing] that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.’”76
Based on its distinction between state imposed barriers and
funding allocations, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ due process
and equal protection claims. Specifically the Court held that “the
Hyde Amendment does not impinge on the due process liberty
recognized in Wade.”77 It also held that the plaintiffs’ equal protec-
tion claim was not entitled to strict scrutiny because it did not im-
pinge upon a right or liberty protected by the Constitution78 or
involve a constitutionally suspect classification.79
C. Extensions of Government Funding Restrictions Beyond Medicaid
Recipients
Following Maher and Harris, federal and state governments ex-
panded the use of government funding programs to restrict access
to abortion services. The first step was the extension of Hyde re-
strictions beyond poor women to other groups that rely on the fed-
eral government for health care coverage. In 1979, abortion
coverage restrictions were introduced for military personnel and
their dependents and for Peace Corps volunteers.80 In the 1980s,
restrictions were put in place for women in prisons, federal em-
ployees and their dependents, and individuals who rely on Indian
Health Services for health care coverage.81
75 Id. at 318. The Court wrote that the decision of whether or not to provide fund-
ing for abortions is a political decision, which is “a question for Congress to answer,
not a matter of constitutional entitlement.”
Id.
76 Id. at 314 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
77 Harris, 448 U.S. at 318.
78 Id. at 322.
79 Id.
80 Boonstra, supra note 5. There are no exceptions for the ban on abortion cover-
age for Peace Corps volunteers. Id.
81 Id.; INDIAN HEALTH SERV., DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SGM 96-01, CUR-
RENT RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE FUNDS FOR ABORTIONS (1996),
available at http://www.ihs.gov/ihm/index.cfm?module=dsp_ihm_sgm_main&sgm=
ihm_sgm_9601.
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Legislation was also introduced that attached restrictions on
abortion-related activities at government facilities and on entities
receiving funding. These restrictions went beyond limiting the
range of health services provided to Medicaid recipients and other
groups receiving government health care coverage to limit the
abortion-related activities of public employees and individuals em-
ployed by programs that received federal funds. They also intro-
duced significant practical obstacles in the path of women seeking
information or access to abortion services beyond the issue of fund-
ing. In Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., the Supreme Court up-
held a Missouri law prohibiting abortion care at public hospitals
and prohibiting public employees from performing abortions,
even if the patient paid for the services.82 In Rust v. Sullivan,83 the
Supreme Court approved restrictions prohibiting any recipient of
Title X family planning funding from engaging in abortion coun-
seling, referral, or advocacy.
Relying on Maher, in Webster and Rust84 the Supreme Court
rejected the claim that “unequal subsidization” violated the Consti-
tution,85 finding instead that the government can “make a value
judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement
that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”86 The Court reaf-
firmed that the government can “selectively fund a program” that it
believes is in the public interest without funding an alternate pro-
gram.87 The Court wrote, “Within far broader limits than petition-
ers are willing to concede, when the Government appropriates
public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits
of that program.”88 The decisions also invoked McRae’s distinction
between positive and negative obligations,89 stating that refusal to
fund a protected activity “cannot be equated with the imposition of
a ‘penalty’ on the substantive right.”90
82 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 501 (1989).
83 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
84 Id. In Rust, the Court also rejected arguments that Title X recipients’ free
speech rights were violated based on a similar distinction between “selective funding”
and a government penalty. Id.
85 Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93; Webster, 492 U.S. at 507–08.
86 Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
87 Id. at 193.
88 Id. at 194.
89 Id. at 201. Because the government has “no constitutional duty to subsidize a[ ]
. . .  constitutionally protected [activity]” it may adopt a legislative policy to fund child-
birth and not abortion and “implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds.” Rust, 500 U.S. at 201 (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 510).
90 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317, n. 19 (1980));
Webster, 492 U.S. at 507 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
2012] HYDE-CARE FOR ALL 409
Just as the Court found that the Hyde Amendment left a poor
woman no worse off than if Congress had decided not to subsidize
health care for the poor, the Court asserted that the funding re-
strictions in Webster and Rust left poor women “no worse off.”91 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court ignored the fact that the re-
strictions did more than refuse to fund abortion services and would
impose significant obstacles in the path of a woman’s decision-mak-
ing about her reproductive health. In Rust, the speech restriction
undermined a woman’s ability to freely exercise her reproductive
choice by suppressing her ability to receive pertinent information
from her health care providers.92 The Court rejected this argument
asserting that a poor woman was still free to obtain information
about abortion-related services outside of the Title X program. In
doing so, it refused to take into consideration that a poor woman
may not have access to a doctor outside of the Title X program,
writing, “But once again, even these Title X clients are in no worse
position than if Congress had never enacted Title X.”93 Similarly,
in Webster, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s hold-
ing that there was a fundamental difference between a prohibition
of government funding to pay for abortion services and prohibiting
staff physicians from performing abortions at existing public hospi-
tals.94 The Eighth Circuit recognized that the distance, cost, and
practical issues such as doctors’ privileges to perform services at
alternative non-public facilities would narrow or possibly foreclose
the availability of abortion care for women.95 The Court refused to
recognize that the restriction on public facilities and employees
for the proposition that the “Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, lib-
erty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual.”).
91 Webster, 492 U.S. at 509 (“Missouri’s refusal to allow public employees to per-
form abortions in public hospitals leave a pregnant woman with the same choices as if
the State had chosen not to operate any public hospitals.”); Rust, 500 U.S. at 202
(“The difficulty that a woman encounters when a Title X project does not provide
abortion counseling or referral leaves her in no different position than she would
have been if the Government had not enacted Title X.”).
92 Rust, 500 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“By suppressing medically per-
tinent information and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to consid-
erations of maternal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in the path
of Title X clients’ freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment
rights.”).
93 Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
94 Webster, 492 U.S. at 503.
95 Id. at 509.
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would impose an obstacle meriting serious constitutional
consideration.96
In addition to impacting women’s ability to access abortion
services, the Title X restrictions challenged in Rust also implicated
the free speech rights of the staff and patients of Title X programs
because of the prohibitions on abortion counseling, advocacy, and
referral. However, the Court rejected First Amendment claims
based on the same distinction between the government’s decision
not to fund a protected activity and government action infringing
upon a right.97 The Court distinguished Rust from cases involving
the conditioning of a benefit on the relinquishment of a constitu-
tional right because Title X allowed recipients to engage in abor-
tion advocacy and activities as long as they were kept separate from
Title X programming.98
D. Criticisms of the Supreme Court Funding Cases
Even before the Supreme Court extended the abortion fund-
ing line of cases in Webster and Rust, there was significant legal and
public sentiment that Maher and Harris had been wrongly decided.
After the Harris decision, challenges to abortion funding restric-
tions moved to the state level. Courts in thirteen states—Alaska,
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and
West Virginia—held that their state constitutions required that
their state Medicaid programs cover medically necessary abortions
even if the federal government would not provide reimbursement
for services.99 Although the state court decisions accepted the Su-
preme Court’s characterization of the abortion right as a negative
96 Id. at 510.
97 Rust, 500 U.S. at 192–93.
98 Id. at 196–98.
99 State, Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28
P.3d 904 (Alaska 2001); Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56
P.3d 28 (Ariz. 2002); Comm. To Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal.
1981); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1986); Doe v. Wright, No. 91-CH-
1958, slip op. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 1994); Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d
387 (Mass. 1981); Women of the State of Minn. by Doe v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17
(Minn. 1995); Jeannette R. v. Ellery, No. BVD-94-811 (Mont. Dist. May 19, 1995); N.M.
Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998); Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); Planned Parenthood Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Human
Res. of State of Or., 663 P.2d 1247 (Or. App. 1983), aff’d on other grounds 687 P.2d 785
(Ore. 1984); Doe v. Celani, No. S81-84CnC, slip op. (Vt. Super. Ct. May 23, 1986);
Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1993). See
WHOSE CHOICE, supra note 44, at 20-21. An additional four states and the District of
Columbia voluntarily opted to cover medically necessary abortions. Id.
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right to be free from a government-imposed obstacle and rejected
any affirmative obligation to ensure that women can access their
right to abortion, the state courts held that when the government
undertakes to fund a public benefit, it must do so in a neutral
way.100 This neutrality requirement is discussed infra in section
IV.B.
The approach taken by the state decisions illustrates some of
the flaws in the Supreme Court’s formalistic distinction between
government-imposed obstacles and discriminatory funding pro-
grams. The Supreme Court abortion funding cases brushed aside
the actual impact the government’s policy would have on a poor
woman’s reproductive health decision-making and options. In con-
trast, the state decisions examined the restrictions from a poor wo-
man’s perspective. The decisions also exhibited a more realistic
and contextualized understanding of women’s decision-making
processes and the impact that the funding restrictions would actu-
ally have on women enrolled in Medicaid.101
1. Considering Women’s Health Interests
The state decisions placed greater emphasis on the rights and
interests impacted by the funding restrictions. The decisions in-
clude passages describing why the abortion right was integral to a
woman’s right to privacy, locating its roots in the right to bodily
integrity and the right to make decisions about family life.102 Un-
100 The courts took great pains to reject an affirmative obligation to ensure that
women can access abortion or other health care related services. Myers, 625 P.2d at
871 (“[T]he state has no constitutional obligation to provide medical care to the
poor”); Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 28 (noting that plaintiffs’ arguments relied on the fact
that differential treatment interfered with women’s decision-making process rather
than a state obligation to fund the exercise of every constitutional right); Panepinto,
446 S.E.2d at 666 (stating that appellees’ assertion that “the state is not obligated to
pay for the exercise of constitutional rights” is true); Byrne, 450 A.2d at 935 n.5
(“[T]he right of the individual is freedom from undue government interference, not
an assurance of government funding”); Simat Corp., 56 P.3d at 32 (“[W]e do not hold
that Arizona’s right of privacy entitles citizens to subsidized abortions.”); Alaska Dep’t
of Health, 28 P.3d at 906 (stating that the issue is “not whether the state is generally
obligated to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights for those who cannot other-
wise afford to do so”); Dep’t of Human Res. of State of Or., 663 P.2d at 1255 (“[T]he
federally protected right of a woman to choose abortion rather than childbirth is a
‘negative’ right: it prohibits a state from obstructing her exercise of that freedom of
choice within the limits of Roe v. Wade, . . . but does not require affirmative action by
the state to remove obstructions that it did not create.”).
101 Wharton et al., supra note 12, at 505.
102 Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 398–99 (stating the right to privacy includes family life and
bodily integrity); Myers, 625 P.2d at 879 (discussing a woman’s right to “retain per-
sonal control over her own body” and her “right to decide for herself whether to
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like Harris, they also explicitly considered women’s health interest
in being able to choose and access medically necessary abortions.
Some of the decisions identified women’s right to health as an ad-
ditional fundamental interest separate from the privacy right.103
Other cases suggested that the right to make personal health care
decisions was an element of the right to privacy. Several cases de-
scribed instances where abortion may be necessary for health rea-
sons and the practical and ethical concerns created by limiting
doctors’ ability to perform medically necessary abortions and forc-
ing a delay in treatment until a condition becomes life threatening.
The California Supreme Court cited prior cases recognizing
that because pregnancy poses health risks, abortion decisions in-
volve “the woman’s right[ ] to life” as well as the right of procrea-
tive choice.104 The court noted that even when a pregnancy is not
deemed life threatening, the abortion decision “directly involves
the woman’s fundamental interest in the preservation of her per-
sonal health.”105 The New Jersey Supreme Court considered wo-
men’s health interest in the balancing test it applied in finding that
a funding restriction violated equal protection. The court balanced
both “the protection of a woman’s health and her fundamental
right to privacy against the asserted state interest in protecting po-
tential life.”106 The court appeared to accord significant weight to a
woman’s health interest because it found that state exclusion of
coverage for nontherapeutic abortions, which do not involve the
same life or health risks to the mother, was permissible.107
Consistent with the recognition of women’s right to health as
an important interest, the state decisions described the myriad situ-
ations where continuation of pregnancy may pose health risks but
not be deemed necessary to save a woman’s life.108 In such situa-
tions, doctors testified that abortion might be the preferred treat-
parent a child.”); Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 27 (discussing the right to “integrity of one’s
own body” and “[t]he right of procreation without state interference”).
103 Maher, 515 A.2d at 150 (“[T]he right to make decisions which are necessary for
the preservation and protection of one’s own health, if not covered in the realm of
privacy, stands in a separate category as a fundamental right protected by the state
constitution.”); Byrne, 450 A.2d at 934, 935 (noting “the high priority accorded by the
State to the rights to privacy and health”). See B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights As
Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 501, 507 (2009)(arguing that the notion
of the abortion right as part of the negative health care right “unquestionably runs
through American abortion jurisprudence.”).
104 Myers, 625 P.2d at 879 (citing People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194 [Cal. 1969]).
105 Id. at 879.
106 Byrne, 450 A.2d at 937.
107 Id.
108 Women of the State of Minn. by Doe v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 24–25 (Minn.
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ment to protect the woman’s health.109 Further, during pregnancy,
cancer treatment and drug therapies for other conditions and pre-
existing diseases normally cannot be provided.110 In such situa-
tions, pregnant women who cannot access an abortion “must
choose either to seriously endanger their own health by forgoing
medication, or to ensure their own safety but endanger the devel-
oping fetus by continuing medication.”111
The decisions also emphasized that the distinction between
life and health is arbitrary in practice and “antithetical to the
medicine in general.”112 The New Jersey Supreme Court noted
“the distinction between life and health may be difficult for even
the most discerning physician.”113 It emphasized that “[w]hen an
abortion is medically necessary is a decision  best made by the pa-
tient in consultation with her physician without the complication
of deciding if that procedure is required to protect her life, but not
her health.”114 The cases also cited doctors’ testimony that health
risks associated with abortions increase later in pregnancy and that
“postponing an abortion unnecessarily is wholly inconsistent with
sound medical practice.”115 The decisions described how denial of
Medicaid funding placed doctors in the position of being forced to
refuse treatment “only to undertake a more complicated and dan-
gerous operation at a later stage when the situation has become
life-threatening.”116
Recognition that women often need abortions for health rea-
sons led several of the state courts to find that it was improper for
state Medicaid programs to single out abortion services for de-
funding. The Alaska Supreme Court struck down a funding restric-
tion on equal protection grounds holding that “[o]nce the State
1995); Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 665 (W. Va.
1993); Maher, 515 A.2d at 142, 154.
109 Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 393–94 (Mass. 1981).
110 Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28, 29–30
(Ariz. 2002) (stating that these conditions include heart disease, diabetes, kidney dis-
ease, liver disease, chronic renal failure, asthma, inflammatory bowel disease, gall
bladder disease, severe mental illness, hypertension, uterine fibroid tumors, epilepsy,
toxemia, and lupus erythematosis). See State, Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned
Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904, 907 (Alaska 2001).
111 Alaska Dep’t. of Health, 28 P.3d at 907.
112 Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 393-394; Maher, 515 A.2d at 155.
113 Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 935 n.6 (N.J. 1982).
114 Id.
115 Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 393. See Byrne, 450 A.2d at 935, n.6; Maher, 515 A.2d at 142,
154-55 (noting that conditions that threaten women’s health early in pregnancies can
become life threatening as pregnancies progress).
116 Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 393.
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undertakes to fund medically necessary services for poor Alaskans,
it may not selectively exclude from the program women who medi-
cally require abortions.”117 Similarly, other state courts found that
denial of coverage for medically necessary abortions was inconsis-
tent with the purposes of Medicaid and state commitments to pro-
vide for the health of the poor.118
2. Considering the Actual Impact of the Restriction on
Poor Women
The state court decisions can also be distinguished from Harris
based on their consideration of the actual impact of the funding
restrictions on the poor women targeted.  The courts emphasized
the importance of measuring the infringement “in light of the ‘re-
ality of the situation’ . . . and the ‘practical considerations’ of the
person the regulation affects.”119 The cases explicitly considered
the impact of monetary incentives on poor women and the impact
of forcing a woman to obtain funding through other sources.
The courts noted that the funding restrictions created a finan-
cial barrier for the very women who could least afford it—poor
women who relied on Medicaid for their health care.120 “[B]y defi-
nition . . .  the only women affected by the restrictions at issue are
those who lack the money or resources to pay for medically super-
vised abortion on their own.”121 The Minnesota Supreme Court
wrote that the funding differential between abortion and preg-
nancy might not interfere with a wealthier woman’s decision-mak-
ing process, but the impact on a poor woman would be different.
[Faced with disparate funding of abortion and childbearing], fi-
nancially independent women might not feel particularly com-
pelled to choose either childbirth or abortion based on the
monetary incentive alone. Indigent women, on the other hand,
are precisely the ones who would be most affected by an offer of
117 State, Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28
P.3d 904, 906 (Alaska 2001).
118 Maher, 515 A.2d at 143 (holding that the regulation was an authorized exercise
of authority because Connecticut law and public policy supported paying “all neces-
sary medical expenses for the poor.”); Women of the State of Minn. by Doe v. Gomez,
542 N.W.2d 17, 26 (Minn. 1995).
119 Maher, 515 A.2d at 153. See also Alaska Dep’t of Health, 28 P. 3d at 910 (“[W]e look
to the real-world effects of the government action to determine the appropriate level
of equal protection scrutiny.”).
120 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 793, 796 (Cal.
1981)(“[T]he state has singled out poor women and has subordinated only their con-
stitutional right of procreative choice to the concern for fetal life.”).
121 Myers, 625 P.2d at 793.
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monetary assistance, and it is these women who are targeted by
the statutory funding ban.122
The California Supreme Court expressed particular concern
about the restriction precisely because it targeted the poor.123
Indeed, the statutory scheme . . . is all the more invidious be-
cause its practical effect is to deny to poor women the right of
choice guaranteed to the rich. An affluent woman who desires
to terminate her pregnancy enjoys the full right to obtain a med-
ical abortion . . . .  By contrast, when the state finances the cost
of childbirth, but will not finance the termination of pregnancy,
it realistically forces an indigent pregnant woman to choose
childbirth even though she had the constitutional right to re-
fuse to do so.124
Several of the decisions suggested that the state had an obliga-
tion to provide more, not less protection for the rights of the poor
women. The Minnesota Supreme Court invoked the state’s tradi-
tion of “affording persons on the periphery of society a greater
measure of government protection and support,”125 and expressed
special concern about the need to protect the rights of Minnesota’s
indigent women.126
The decisions also considered the alternatives available to
poor women denied public funding for therapeutic abortions and
the practical effects of forcing women to find other funding
sources. The courts noted that women would be forced to delay
procedures while they tried to raise medical costs, resulting in later
abortions with far greater health risks.127 Obtaining funding for a
medical procedure outside of the Medicaid scheme also had a pu-
nitive impact on women’s benefits. The West Virginia and Con-
necticut courts noted that if a woman received funding to pay for a
medical procedure outside of the Medicaid system, the funding
must be reported as income which could render the woman ineligi-
ble for public benefits or decrease her benefits.128
122 Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 31. See Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto,
446 S.E.2d 658, 667 (W. Va. 1993)(“[F]or the indigent woman, the state’s offer of
subsidies for one reproductive option and the imposition of a penalty for the other
necessarily influences her federally-protected choice.”).
123 Myers, 625 P.2d at 796.
124 Id. at 799.
125 Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 30; Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 152 (Conn. Sup. Ct.
1986)(noting Connecticut’s long history and tradition of health care for the poor).
126 Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 31.
127 State, Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc., 28
P.3d 904, 907 (Alaska 2001); Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 26.
128 Women’s Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 664–65 (W.
Va. 1993); Maher, 515 A.2d at 154.
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III. WHERE WE ARE NOW: THE PRIVATIZATION OF HYDE
After the federal government extended Hyde restrictions to all
women who relied on the federal government for health care and
the state abortion funding cases were litigated, an uneasy status
quo emerged around health care funding for abortion services,
with the federal government and the majority of states prohibiting
public funding, except in cases of life endangerment, rape, and
incest, and a minority of states funding medically necessary abor-
tions. At the same time, while the majority of women with govern-
ment health care were denied coverage for medically necessary
abortions, most women with private health care insurance had
abortion coverage.129 This state of affairs was disrupted when fed-
eral health care reform started to blur the lines between public and
private health care.
Although the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”)130 did not prohibit abortion coverage, the debate around
the ACA131 and the compromise crafted by Congress and the
Obama administration resulted in setbacks for both the public dia-
logue and legal landscape around health care coverage for abor-
tion care. The administration’s failure to challenge the current
Hyde restrictions on federal funding further entrenched the provi-
sions as a reasonable compromise position and the status quo.132
Not only was there a failure to articulate why a government health
care policy that excluded coverage for a medically necessary proce-
dure might be problematic, but the debate also failed to question
whether it is appropriate for the government to use a public bene-
fit program to coerce poor women’s choices about their health
care and reproductive decision-making.
The failure to revisit the Hyde Amendment itself continues to
129 Abortion Care Coverage and Health Care Reform: Getting the Facts Straight, PLANNED
PARENTHOOD, (July 27, 2009), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/news
room/press-releases/abortion-care-coverage-health-care-reform-getting-facts-straight-
29733.htm (stating that the “majority of private insurance plans today cover abortion
care”).
130 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
131 Jennifer Keighley, Health Care Reform and Reproductive Rights: Sex Equality Argu-
ments for Abortion Coverage in a National Plan, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 357, 357 n.7,
359, 369–70 (2010).
132 See Exec. Order No. 13,535 § 1, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 29, 2010) (“Following
the recent enactment of the [ACA], it is necessary to establish an adequate enforce-
ment mechanism to ensure that Federal funds are not used for abortion services (ex-
cept in cases of rape or incest, or when the life of the woman would be endangered),
consistent with a longstanding Federal statutory restriction that is commonly known
as the Hyde Amendment.”).
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have significant consequences on women who rely on government
health care. The number of individuals impacted by the Hyde
Amendment will substantially increase under the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion. Although Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebe-
lius gives states the option of participating in Medicaid expan-
sion,133 the Congressional Budget Office estimates that Medicaid
and CHIP will cover an additional eleven million people by
2022.134
Under the ACA, a projected twenty-five million Americans will
obtain health insurance through newly created state health insur-
ance exchanges.135 Low and modest income individuals who buy
insurance through the exchanges will receive tax credits and cost-
sharing payment reductions.136 Rather than rejecting the Hyde
Amendment, both the ACA and an implementing Executive Order
issued by President Obama parrot the amendment’s funding re-
strictions and apply them to insurance policies offered on the in-
surance exchanges.137 In doing so, the ACA and Executive Order
suggest that tax credits and cost-sharing reduction payments for
insurance plans that cover abortion care are akin to federal fund-
ing of abortion.138 To avoid the possible use of federal funds to
subsidize premium payments for a plan covering abortion services
outside of the Hyde exceptions, the ACA requires that insurers seg-
regate federal funds in a separate account that cannot be used to
pay abortion benefits outside of the exceptions.139 These segrega-
tion requirements may make the defeat of attempts to ban abor-
tion coverage in exchange insurance policies a Pyrrhic victory. The
133 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
134 CBO, supra note 3, Table 1. Federal law prohibits the use of federal Medicaid
and CHIP funds for abortions except in the case of life endangerment, rape or incest,
but states have the authority to use their own funds to cover abortion in a broader
range of circumstances. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, supra note 5, at 8.
135 CBO, supra note 3, Table 1. The number of individuals obtaining coverage on
the exchanges is estimated to be nine million in 2014 and twenty-five million by 2022.
Id.
136 HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: QUESTIONS
ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/health
reform/upload/7962-02.pdf.
137 Exec. Order No. 13,535 § 1, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 29, 2010); 42 U.S.C.
§ 18023(b)(1)(B) (2010). The ACA distinguishes between “abortions for which pub-
lic funding is allowed” and “abortions for which public funding is prohibited” and
tracks federal law by basing the definitions of these terms on whether the Department
of Health and Human Services may expend federal funds on them or not. Id.
138 Exec. Order No. 13,535, at § 2, 75 Fed. Reg. 15,599 (Mar. 29, 2010); 42 U.S.C.
§ 18023(b)(2) (2010).
139 HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ACCESS TO ABORTION COVERAGE AND HEALTH
REFORM 3 (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8021.pdf.
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coverage restrictions are so stringent that leading insurance ex-
perts have suggested that most insurers will simply decline to sell
policies covering abortion care on the exchanges—and eventually
in the broader private market as well.140
Although the ACA technically allows abortion coverage in ex-
change policies, the fight has now moved to the state level. The
ACA requires that states create insurance exchanges by 2014, and
states are beginning to hammer out what the exchanges will look
like. Energized by the federal debate around abortion coverage,
state legislators have not only passed laws prohibiting insurance
policies on state exchanges from covering abortion care, they have
also passed legislation prohibiting all private health insurance poli-
cies from covering abortion.141 State legislators have also expanded
the concept of public funding to look not just at whether the state
is paying health care costs for individual women seeking abortions,
but also to whether it funds entities that may provide or refer to
abortion services, even if state dollars are not used to pay for the
services.
A. The New State Landscape
Prior to the passage of the ACA, only five states banned insur-
ance coverage for abortion care.142 Just over two years after the
ACA was signed into law, more than a third of states have passed
laws to ban abortion coverage on their health care exchanges. As of
June 2012, eighteen states—Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, In-
diana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Wis-
consin, and Virginia—passed legislation prohibiting insurers from
140 Gold, supra note 7, at 9.
141 Jacqueline R. Thomas, Abortion to be Considered an Essential Benefit, CONN. MIR-
ROR, June 8, 2012, http://www.ctmirror.org/story/16602/abortion-be-considered-es-
sential-health-benefit. At least one state has imposed restrictions in the other
direction. Connecticut has found that abortion is an essential benefit that must be
covered by insurance policies offered on its exchange. Id.
142 The states were Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, North Dakota, and Oklahoma. See
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2210A (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.5-160 (West 2012);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.805 (West 2010)(amended 2010 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 793
(West)); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §14-02.3-03 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
1-741.2 (West 2012) repealed by Laws 2011, c. 92, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2011. See Keighley,
supra note 131, at 367 n.47; Roy G. Spece, Jr., Note, The Purpose Prong of Casey’s Undue
Burden Test and Its Impact on the Constitutionality of Abortion Insurance Restrictions in the
Affordable Care Act or Its Progeny, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 77, 91 (2011); Nat’l Educ. Ass’n
of R.I. v. Garrahy, 598 F. Supp. 1374 (D. R.I. 1984), aff’d 779 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1986).
In addition, Rhode Island passed a statute prohibiting abortion coverage, but it was
found unconstitutional. Id.
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covering abortions in exchange policies.143 The exact provisions of
the restrictions varied, but most allowed exceptions where a wo-
man’s life is in danger but not her health.144 More than half also
included exceptions for abortions in instances of rape or incest.145
Louisiana and Tennessee do not recognize any exceptions.146 Per-
haps more troubling, Kansas, Nebraska, and Utah went beyond
plans offered on the exchanges and banned private insurance cov-
erage for abortion services.147 Some states that have banned the
inclusion of abortion services in health insurance policies allow in-
surers to offer separate riders covering abortion for an additional
143 S.B. 10, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-121 (2010);
H.B. 97, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (FL 2011); S.B. 1115, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2011);
H.B. 1210, 117th Gen. Assemb. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); H.B. 2075, 2011-2012
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1014 (2011); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-41-97 to 99 (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.805 (2012); L.B. 22, 102nd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Neb. 2011); H.B. 79, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011-2012); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-741.3 (West 2012); S.B. 102, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(S.C. 2011-2012); H.B. 1185, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-
26-134 (2012); H.B. 354, 2011 Gen., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2011); S.B. 92, 2011-2012 Leg.,
Reg Sess. (Wis. 2011); H.B. 2434, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2011). Of the
fourteen states, three states, Idaho, Missouri, and Oklahoma already had laws prohib-
iting abortion coverage in general insurance policies. These three states adopted ad-
ditional legislation specifically prohibiting abortion coverage in policies offered on
the exchanges. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2210A (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.805 (West
2010) (amended 2010 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 793 (West)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-
1-741.3 (West 2012) (amended by 2011 OK S.B. 547 (West)). See CTR. FOR REPROD.
RIGHTS, 2011: A LOOK BACK 4, 10, 12, 16 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 LOOK BACK], availa-
ble at http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/end
ofyear_2011_FINAL.pdf. For an in depth discussion of the Louisiana statute see J.
Daniel Siefker, Jr., Comment, Louisiana’s Abortion Politics and the Constitution: The At-
tempt to Regulate Health Insurance Benefits in the Wake of the National Healthcare Reform, 13
LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 253 (2011).
144 GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: RESTRICTING INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF ABORTION (2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_
RICA.pdf. Although more restrictive than a general health exception, Arizona, Indi-
ana, and Utah have created exceptions where pregnancy poses a risk of irreversible
impairment of a major bodily function. Wisconsin has an exception for serious physi-
cal health conditions and South Dakota for a medical emergency. Id. See also S.B. 10,
2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012); H.B. 1185, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2012).
145 See supra note 143. The states are Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi,
Ohio, Virginia, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and Utah. Id.
146 See supra note 143.
147 H.B. 2075, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011) (prohibiting insurers on the
private market from offering abortion coverage except where necessary to save a wo-
man’s life, optional riders are available); L.B. 22, 102nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011)
(prohibiting insurers in private market and exchanges from offering coverage for
abortion except where necessary to avert a woman’s death, riders are available); H.B.
354, 2011 Gen., Reg. Sess. (Utah 2011) (barring coverage except in cases of rape,
incest, lethal fetal anomaly, life endangerment or risk of severe injury; no riders al-
lowed); 2011 LOOK BACK, supra note 143, at 4, 12, 13, 18; GUTTMACHER INST., supra
note 144.
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cost.148 However, even if insurance companies are permitted to of-
fer separate riders, there is no guarantee they will offer them or
that employers will choose to elect to purchase riders for employer
plans.149 Further, even if the option is available, it is questionable
how many women will purchase a separate rider for a single health
care service.
Other states are using state funding to restrict abortion ser-
vices in more creative ways. Arizona prohibited funding of medical
training to perform abortions.150 It also passed a law preventing
taxpayers from taking a state charitable deduction for donations to
any organization that provides or refers to abortion services or sup-
ports any entity that does so.151 In 2011, Ohio passed a budget that
prohibits abortions from being performed in public facilities.152
States also passed laws de-funding Planned Parenthood and other
health care providers that perform or advocate for abortion ser-
vices.153 The legislation appeared to be motivated by a desire to
punish Planned Parenthood for its involvement in providing abor-
tions.154 Sponsors also argued that the funding ban was necessary
to prevent Planned Parenthood from using state dollars to pay for
abortion services even though Planned Parenthood maintained
separate projects for abortion care and family planning and did
not commingle funds.155
148 See, e.g., H.B. 2075, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011); L.B. 22, 102nd Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011).
149 See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
at 6, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kan. & W. Mo. v. Praeger, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D.
Kan. 2012)(No. 11-2462-JAR-KGG), 2012 WL 2375233 (stating that after the Kansas
law passed not all insurance companies offered riders and even where riders are of-
fered in a group plan, it is up to the employer to decide whether to purchase it, not
the individual employee).
150 H.B. 2384, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (prohibiting the use of state funds
for medical training for abortion); 2011 LOOK BACK, supra note 143, at 8.
151 H.B. 2384, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); 2011 LOOK BACK, supra note 143,
at 8.
152 H.B. 153, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011-2012); CTR. FOR REPROD.
RIGHTS, 2011 MID-YEAR LEGISLATIVE WRAP-UP 21 (2011), available at http://reproduc-
tiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/state_midyr_wrapup_2011_
8.10.11.pdf.
153 See H.B. 1210, 117th Gen. Assemb. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011); S.B. 7, 82nd
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011); 2011 LOOK BACK, supra note 143, at 10, 18. Kansas and
North Carolina passed 2012 budgets prohibiting Planned Parenthood from receiving
state funds. 2011 LOOK BACK, supra note 143, at 12, 14.  Wisconsin passed a budget
prohibiting state funding to Planned Parenthood and other facilities that perform or
refer for abortions. Id. at 19.
154 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.C. v. Cansler, 804 F. Supp. 2d 482, 496
(M.D.N.C. 2011).
155 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Brownback, 799 F. Supp. 2d
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Lawsuits challenging the new funding restrictions have not
proceeded past the district court level and so far have met with
mixed success. Following the grant of a preliminary injunction, the
State of Arizona agreed to permanently enjoin the prohibition on
state tax credits for donations to organizations that provide, or re-
fer to organizations that provide, abortions.156 The funding restric-
tions targeting Planned Parenthood in Indiana, Kansas, and North
Carolina have been enjoined.157A fourth funding restriction in
Texas was initially enjoined, but the Fifth Circuit lifted the injunc-
tion.158 As discussed infra, the sole case challenging a private insur-
ance ban, although still pending, has been less successful. The
court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and
the case is still pending. Although bans on insurance coverage on
state insurance exchanges will have a significant impact on wo-
men’s ability to obtain insurance coverage for abortion services, to
date, no lawsuits have been filed to challenge the bans, which do
not go into effect until 2014.
B. Challenges to Private Insurance Bans
The private insurance bans create an obstacle for women seek-
ing an abortion.  They are distinguishable from the Supreme
Court’s abortion funding cases because they do not involve deci-
sions about the allocation of government funds. Instead, they cre-
ate an obstacle preventing women from accessing private insurance
funding and should be reviewed by courts as a state imposed re-
striction on access to abortion. As discussed below, the First Circuit
came to this conclusion when it reviewed a private insurance ban
in the 1986 case Garrahy v. Calderone.
Garrahy and the abortion funding cases were decided when
the Supreme Court applied the Roe v. Wade standard to determine
the constitutionality of abortion restrictions. The Roe standard’s tri-
mester framework prohibited most abortion restrictions during the
first trimester and only permitted regulation of abortion proce-
1218, 1224, 1234 (D. Kan. 2011) (The amendment’s sponsor stated that it “took all
state funding away from Planned Parenthood to ensure that state dollars are not used
for abortion services.”).
156 State Drops Defense of Arizona Law that Would Have Withheld Critical Resources for
Women’s Health, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ARIZ. (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http:/
/acluaz.org/issues/reproductive-rights/2012-01/1733.
157 Cansler, 804 F. Supp. 2d 482; Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of
Ind. State Dep’t. of Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d 892, 905-909, 911(S.D. Ind. 2011); Brown-
back, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1218.
158 Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cnty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 828 F. Supp. 2d
872 (W.D. Tex. 2012) vacated and remanded, 692 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2012).
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dures during the second trimester in ways that were reasonably re-
lated to the promotion of maternal health.159 The abortion
funding cases avoided review under Roe’s strict standard by distin-
guishing government funding decisions from government-imposed
restrictions.160 Because the Garrahy court held that a private insur-
ance ban is a government restriction, it applied the Roe standard
and held the ban unconstitutional. However, in 1992 the Supreme
Court’s standard for reviewing abortion restrictions changed when
Planned Parenthood v. Casey introduced the undue burden standard.
This section looks at pre-Casey private insurance ban cases, de-
scribes how Casey’s undue burden standard changed the Court’s
review of government-imposed abortion restrictions, and discusses
the first post-Casey private insurance ban case.
1. Pre-Casey Challenges to Insurance Bans
Private insurance bans have been challenged before with
mixed results. In 1986, the First Circuit affirmed a district court
decision striking down a Rhode Island private insurance ban. In
1992, the Eighth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in
favor of plaintiffs challenging a Missouri ban.
In National Association of Rhode Island v. Garrahy,161 the District
Court of Rhode Island found that a state law that prohibited abor-
tion coverage in comprehensive health insurance policies, except if
the life of the mother was endangered or in instances of rape or
incest, was unconstitutional. The court distinguished Harris and
Maher finding that restricting private insurance constituted a gov-
ernment-created obstacle to abortion. While
a state is not constitutionally compelled to pay to remove finan-
cial burdens it did not impose, [Harris and Maher] clearly gave
no license to the converse, the idea that government is free to
create financial obstacles to abortion.162
The district court noted that the Maher decision relied heavily
on the fact that the women who were denied Medicaid funding
could “continue as before to be dependent on private sources.”163
159 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992).
160 See supra Part II.A-C.
161 Nat’l Educ. Ass’n of R.I. v. Garrahy, 598 F. Supp. 1374 (D. R.I. 1984).
162 Id. at 1384.
163 Id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)). Garrahy cited a Third
Circuit decision invalidating a Pennsylvania law that required private insurers to issue
policies that exclude abortions and that cost less than policies that include abortions
because the “requirement adds an additional barrier to a woman’s access to an abor-
tion.” Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Pa. Section v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d
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Deciding the case pre-Casey, the court applied strict scrutiny to the
provision and found it unconstitutional.164
Six years later, as the Supreme Court began its retreat from
Roe, the Eighth Circuit relied on its interpretation of the newly de-
veloping “undue burden” standard rather than the abortion fund-
ing cases to reverse a district court grant of summary judgment
invalidating a private insurance ban. Although Coe v. Melahn,165 was
decided before Casey, the Eighth Circuit anticipated that the Su-
preme Court was moving toward upholding restrictions on abor-
tion outside the public funding context. Its decision shifted the
inquiry from whether or not the law constituted a government-cre-
ated obstacle to the weight of the obstacle created. Relying on a
non-funding case in which the Supreme Court upheld second tri-
mester abortion restrictions despite the fact that they would cause
delay and make abortion services more expensive, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that the insurance ban did not constitute an undue bur-
den and declined to apply strict scrutiny.166
2. Casey’s Undue Burden Standard
In the 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme
Court articulated a new standard for reviewing abortion restric-
tions outside of the public funding context that would result in its
upholding abortion restrictions that previously had been found un-
constitutional under Roe. Casey held that the government can inter-
fere with women’s decision-making process prior to viability as long
as it does not impose an undue burden.167 The Court wrote that:
throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure
that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to
advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their pur-
pose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abor-
tion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the
right.168
283, 303 (3d Cir. 1984) aff’d sub nom. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
164 Garrahy, 598 F. Supp. at 1385 (citing City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444 n.33 (1983) overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833). Under the
Roe standard, the court held that “any statute, other than a ‘governmental spending
statute,’ . . . that adds cost and delay to the abortion procedure will not survive if it has
any significant impact on the abortion right, unless justified by a compelling state
interest.” Id. at 1383–84.
165 Coe v. Melahn, 958 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1992).
166 Id. at 225–226.
167 Casey, 505 U.S. at 873, 875–76.
168 Id. at 878.
424 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:391
The Casey decision stated that “an undue burden is a short-
hand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”169 The Court explained that
a statute that has the purpose of creating an undue burden is inva-
lid because the means chosen by the state to further its “interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free
choice, not hinder it.”170
Although Casey suggested that a restriction would be unconsti-
tutional if it had the purpose or effect of creating an undue bur-
den, in practice courts have been reluctant to rely on the improper
purpose prong alone as grounds to invalidate a restriction.171 In-
stead courts either fail to engage in a searching inquiry into legisla-
tive purpose172 or conflate purpose with effect.173 The decisions
considering whether restrictions were passed with an improper
purpose have also been criticized for mechanically holding that re-
strictions that are similar to those upheld in Casey are constitu-
tional without independently considering the legislature’s intent in
enacting them. Commentators have suggested that review of a dif-
ferent type of restriction may result in a more searching inquiry.174
The majority of cases applying the undue burden standard have
involved restrictions that arguably seek to achieve a permissible
goal, such as “promoting a woman’s informed choice,” but also
have the collateral effect of imposing obstacles in the form of delay
or expense. The private funding restrictions appear to have no pur-
pose other than to create a financial obstacle in the path of a wo-
man seeking an abortion. Thus, challenges to the private insurance
bans will provide courts an opportunity to consider whether laws
designed solely to burden access to abortion are constitutional.
3. Private Insurance Bans: ACLU v. Praeger
In 2011, the ACLU brought the first post-Casey challenge to a
169 Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
170 Id.
171 Wharton et al., supra note 12, at 377–85.
172 Id. at 377. But see Planned Parenthood of Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp.
2d 1025, 1044–46 (D. Neb. 2010) (granting a preliminary injunction and holding that
the only sensible construction of a statute which imposed informed consent require-
ments that were impossible or nearly impossible to comply with and placing doctors
in immediate danger of crippling litigation was that it was intended to place a “sub-
stantial, if not insurmountable, obstacle in the path of any woman seeking an abor-
tion in Nebraska”).
173 Wharton et al. supra note 12, at 344–45, 377.
174 Id. at 384–85.
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private insurance ban. The case challenged a newly enacted Kansas
law that prohibited insurance companies from covering abortion
services in their comprehensive plans, except in instances when the
abortion was necessary to save a woman’s life. The complaint al-
leged due process and equal protection violations, but the ACLU’s
preliminary injunction motion relied solely on the improper pur-
pose prong of the undue burden standard.175 The district court
denied the motion, though it specifically left the question of
whether the law had the effect of creating a substantial obstacle
open.176 The case is still pending.177
In its opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction,
Kansas argued that the private insurance ban should be reviewed
under a rational basis standard like the abortion funding cases and
the law should be upheld because the state could rationally choose
to regulate insurance in a manner that subsidizes normal child-
birth but not non-therapeutic abortions.178 However, the abortion
funding cases were premised on the Supreme Court’s distinction
between a discriminatory benefits program and a government-im-
posed obstacle. As the Garrahy court pointed out, a private insur-
ance ban imposes an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion. Indeed, the Maher decision emphasized that the govern-
ment’s discriminatory benefits program would still leave Medicaid
recipients free to obtain funding through private sources.179 The
Kansas law imposes a state obstacle that prevents a woman from
obtaining funding from private sources. Although the district court
correctly recognized that the undue burden standard applied to
the Kansas law, it denied the preliminary injunction motion find-
ing that the ACLU failed to show that the “Kansas legislature’s pre-
dominant motive . . . was to create a substantial obstacle to
abortion.”180 In particular, the court suggested that the state might
have a permissible interest in protecting the conscience rights of
175 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kan. & W. Mo. v. Praeger, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1204,
1210 (D. Kan. 2011).  This may be because it was difficult to prove what the effect of
the law would be before it went into effect.
176 Praeger, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (“Whether the practical effect of the law is to
actually create a substantial obstacle is another question, but plaintiff has not at-
tempted in this motion to put on evidence to establish such an effect, and the court
expresses no opinion here on that question.”)(emphasis added).
177 In March 2012, the District Court denied a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
equal protection claim. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kansas & W. Mo. v. Praeger, 863
F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Kan. 2012).
178 Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Kansas & W. Mo. v. Praeger, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Kan. 2012).
179 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
180 Praeger, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
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individuals who buy health care insurance who may not want their
premiums to contribute to risk pools that pay medical providers
who perform abortions.
The court’s decision reflects a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of insurance and the relationship between individu-
als who buy health insurance. Insurance constitutes a contract be-
tween the insurer and the insured where the insured pays a
premium to the insurer to indemnify him or her against a risk.181
As argued by the ACLU in its subsequent motion for summary
judgment,
[t]here is no ‘subsidy’ by any third party in the contractual
agreement between insurer and insured. . . .  As in any business
enterprise, an insurance company’s customers pay for the ser-
vices they receive, and the company operates on the revenues it
receives; neither the insurer nor any insured ‘subsidizes’ any-
thing in this commercial transaction.182
Perhaps more troubling is the state’s assertion that the individ-
uals who buy health insurance have a “conscience right” to prevent
other individuals from obtaining insurance coverage for abortion
care simply because they may use the same insurance company.183
The idea that unnamed individuals, who are neither the women
receiving abortion care nor the medical professionals providing
care, have a conscience right to interfere with others’ right to ob-
tain insurance coverage for abortion care would constitute a dra-
matic and potentially limitless expansion of the concept of
conscientious refusal.184
181 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining insurance as “[a] contract by
which one party (the insurer) undertakes to indemnify another party (the insured)
against risk of loss, damage, or liability arising from the occurrence of some specified
contingency . . .  An insured party usu. pays a premium to the insurer in exchange for
the insurer’s assumption of the insured’s risk.”).
182 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 149, at 18–19.
183 For a discussion about problems with extending conscientious refusal claims to
health care institutions, which are several steps closer to the actual provision of ser-
vices than health care insurers or individual insurance buyers, see Elizabeth Sepper,
Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 101 (2012) (introducing a new framework to
evaluate conscientious objection claims that negotiates between individual and institu-
tional interests to protect conscience more consistently).
184 International human rights law recognizes that only medical personnel directly
providing abortions have conscience rights and that exercise of their rights cannot
compromise the health and reproductive rights of others. See e.g., T-388/09, discussed
infra note 201; R.R. v. Poland, App. No. 27617/04, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 206 (“States
are obliged to organise their health services in such a way as to ensure that an effec-
tive exercise of the freedom of conscience of health professionals in the professional
context does not prevent patients from obtaining access to services to which they are
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The Praeger case is still pending. The ACLU has moved for
summary judgment arguing that Kansas has essentially conceded
an improper purpose by asserting in its pleadings that it enacted
the law to “treat abortion differently than other medical proce-
dures” and to make it more expensive than childbirth.185 The out-
come of the case may ultimately turn on what showing the court
requires to establish that the law’s predominant purpose was to im-
pose a substantial obstacle to abortion186 and whether it accepts
the protection of the conscience rights of unnamed anti-choice in-
surance purchasers to be a valid and plausible alternative govern-
ment motive.187 Although the ACLU has strong grounds to assert
that the law violates the undue burden standard, the standard itself
is problematic because it explicitly allows the government to adopt
policies that impose abortion restrictions as long as the plaintiff
cannot establish that the law’s purpose or effect is to impose a sub-
stantial obstacle. As discussed below, a more rights-protective ap-
proach would impose an obligation on the government to adopt
polices to ensure that women have access to abortion care rather
than delineate the circumstances under which it may adopt poli-
cies to undermine access.
IV. WHERE WE COULD BE: ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO LOOK AT
HEALTH CARE COVERAGE FOR ABORTION
This section considers three alternative ways to analyze abor-
entitled under applicable legislation.”); Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, General Recommendation No. 24, Article 12 of the Convention
(Women and Health) A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. I ¶ 11 (1999), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453882a73.html (“[I]f health service providers refuse to
perform such services based on conscientious objection, measures should be intro-
duced to ensure that women are referred to alternative health providers.”). See Ber-
nard M. Dickens, Legal Protection and Limits of Conscientious Objection: When Conscientious
Objection is Unethical, 28 MED. & L. 337 (2009).
185 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 149, at 13.
186 The ACLU may also be able to prove that the law has the effect of imposing a
substantial obstacle under the other prong of the undue burden test.
187 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 149, at 11–12. The ACLU argues that the Supreme Court has only recognized
three valid state interests for imposing abortion restrictions (1) the state’s interest in
potential life, (2) its interest in the “health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion,”
and (3) its interest “in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”
It asserts that the State can only advance its interest in potential life by adopting mea-
sures to inform women’s decision-making. Id. According to the ACLU, these three
interests reflect a careful balancing by the Supreme Court of the interests at stake,
and although the Supreme Court has not foreclosed the possibility of additional valid
interests, it cannot be that any state interest that would be permissible under a ra-
tional basis review would establish a valid purpose in the abortion context. Id. at 16.
428 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:391
tion funding restrictions in the public and private context. It first
considers the adoption of a concept of reproductive autonomy that
includes an affirmative government obligation to take steps to en-
sure rights. This formulation provides the most robust protection
for reproductive rights, but is the furthest from current Supreme
Court doctrine. The second section considers the minority view in
the United States reflected by the standard adopted by U.S. state
court decisions that require Medicaid funding of medically neces-
sary abortions. The “neutrality” standard does not recognize affirm-
ative government obligations, but requires that when the
government undertakes programs to fund and provide benefits
that it do so in a neutral, non-coercive way. The last section looks at
a recent case from the Supreme Court of Canada that suggests that
even a negative conception of the rights to liberty and personal
security would require that the government refrain from prohibit-
ing private insurance coverage.
A. Affirmative Obligation: Decisions from the ECHR, Colombia and
Nepal
Although in the U.S. fundamental rights protected by the
Constitution are generally conceived as a “negative” freedom from
government violation or intervention,188 there is growing interna-
tional recognition that respect for civil and political rights may re-
quire affirmative government action.189 Recent cases from the
European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), the Constitutional
Court of Colombia, and the Supreme Court of Nepal recognize
that women have a right to access legal abortion care and explore
the affirmative government obligations that flow from the right.
The ECHR’s decision was based on the right to private life and
privacy, while the cases from Colombia and Nepal invoked a
broader range of rights including dignity, liberty and autonomy,
health, non-discrimination, freedom from cruel, inhuman, and de-
grading treatment, freedom from sexual violence, and the benefit
from scientific progress.190 The cases go farther than the state
188 Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 384. See Louis Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1582, 1589 (1981) (discussing that U.S. rights theory is a negative
rights theory, explaining that “Congress is not required to do anything to protect or
promote individual rights, or to make them effective, or more effective”) (emphasis
added).
189 See supra Part I.B.
190 Lakshmi Dhikta v. Nepal, Supreme Court of Nepal 2009, 6 (unofficial translation
on file with author); Emilia Ordolis, Lessons From Colombia: Abortion Equality and Consti-
tutional Choices, 20 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & THE L. 263, 265 (2008).
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funding decisions discussed infra because in addition to requiring
that the government refrain from imposing barriers and
decriminalize abortion, the cases articulate an affirmative govern-
ment obligation to take steps to make services accessible.
1. ECHR: R.R. v. Poland
In a 2011 case, R.R. v. Poland, the European Court of Human
Rights held that a woman’s right to determine whether to continue
a pregnancy falls within the sphere of private life and privacy and
that there are “positive obligations inherent in effective ‘respect’
for private life.”191 The ECHR found that if Polish law allows for
abortions in cases of fetal abnormality, it must take steps to ensure
that the right is not merely theoretical by establishing effective and
accessible procedures to ensure that a pregnant woman has access
to diagnostic services necessary for her to determine whether fetal
abnormalities exist.192
2. Colombian Constitutional Court: C-355/06 and T-388/
09
While R.R. recognized that respect of the right to privacy may
entail affirmative government obligations to adopt effective proce-
dures, it did not tackle the more thorny question of whether the
government has an obligation to create enabling conditions or en-
sure that sufficient resources are available so that all women, rich
or poor, can access abortion care.193 In two recent decisions, the
Colombian Constitutional Court held both that women have a con-
stitutional right to access abortion in certain circumstances and
that the government has an obligation to take steps to ensure that
abortion services are available throughout the country and as part
of the public health network. It also emphasized that inability to
pay for services should not prevent women from accessing abortion
care.
In its landmark case C-355/06, the Colombian Constitutional
court struck down parts of a criminal abortion ban, holding that
women’s fundamental rights limited the legislature’s power to
criminalize abortion in all circumstances.194 The court’s recogni-
191 R.R. v. Poland, App. No. 27617/04, ¶¶ 184, 214 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011).
192 Id. ¶¶ 210, 213.
193 Id. ¶ 198. The ECHR distinguished R.R. from cases alleging denial of health
services for “reasons of insufficient funding or availability.” Id.
194 Corte Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia C-
355/06 (Colom.), available at http://www.unifr.ch/ddp1/derechopenal/jurispru-
dencia/j_20080616_03.pdf (in Spanish). Excerpts from C-355/06 are available at
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tion of women’s sexual and reproductive rights was strongly influ-
enced by international human rights law, which forms part of the
“constitutional block or bundle” that guides the Constitutional
Court’s decisions.195 The decision extensively discussed interna-
tional human rights standards concluding that “women’s sexual
and reproductive rights have finally been recognized as human
rights and, as such, they have become part of constitutional
rights.”196 Applying a proportionality analysis, the court held that
the criminal abortion ban impermissibly infringed on women’s
right to dignity, autonomy, life, health, and personal integrity be-
cause it lacked exceptions for instances where the woman’s life or
health was at risk, where pregnancy results from rape or incest, and
where the fetus has malformations incompatible with life outside
the womb.197
The court noted that its decision decriminalized abortion
under the three circumstances discussed above without the need
for further legislative or regulatory action, but it also noted that
women’s sexual and reproductive rights imposed an affirmative ob-
ligation on the government. The court cited international human
rights law standards imposing state duties to “offer a wide range of
high quality and accessible health services, which must include sex-
ual and reproductive health services,” and to eliminate obstacles
that impede women’s access to services and education and infor-
mation.198 The court invited the legislature and other authorities
to  “adopt[ ] decisions within their discretion . . . in order to fulfill
their duties with respect to the constitutional rights of women”
such as “taking measures that will effectively ensure women access
http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/pdf_pubs/pub_c3552006.pdf [hereinafter C-
355/06 Translation]; Martha F. Davis, Abortion Access in the Global Marketplace, 88 N.C.
L. REV. 1657, 1679–80 (2010); Ordolis, supra note 190, at 265.
195 The Colombian Constitution explicitly incorporates international human rights
treaties ratified by Colombia into its domestic legal system. Article 93 of the Constitu-
tion provides that human rights treaties have “priority domestically” and that “[t]he
rights and duties mentioned in [the] Charter will be interpreted in accordance with
international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia.” See Veronica Undurraga &
Rebecca Cook, Constitutional Incorporation of International and Comparative Human
Rights Law: The Colombian Constitutional Court Decision C-355/2006 in CONSTITUTING
EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 215, 225 (Susan
H. Williams, ed. 2009) (explaining the concept of the “constitutional block”).
196 C-355/06 Translation, supra note 194, at 31. The court held that “the rights of
the pregnant woman [are] protected by the Constitution of 1991 as well as by the
international human rights treaties that are part of the Constitutional Bundle.” C-355/
06 Translation at 59.
197 C-355/06 Translation, supra note 194, at 51–57. Undurraga & Cook, supra note
195, at 238–39.
198 C-355/06 Translation, supra note 194, at 28–29.
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in conditions of equality and safety.”199 In response to the court’s
decision, in December 2006, the Minister of Social Protection is-
sued a regulation, which set out specific measures to ensure access
to abortion services including coverage of legal abortions by the
public health system.200
In 2009, the Constitutional Court issued a second decision
providing more guidance on the government’s obligation to en-
sure access to abortion in instances where it is constitutionally pro-
tected.201 Case T-388/09 involved a municipal judge who refused
to grant a court order permitting an abortion that was permissible
under C-355/06 due to severe fetal abnormalities because of his
personal beliefs opposing abortion. In upholding an intermediate
court decision overturning the ruling and ordering termination of
the pregnancy, the Constitutional Court stressed the gravity and
impropriety of the municipal judge’s actions.202 It emphasized that
judicial officers have a duty to apply the law and cannot refuse to
perform their duties based on personal convictions.203 The court
also stated that conscientious objection is not an absolute right and
that it is limited to the extent that it violates the fundamental rights
of others, including women’s sexual and reproductive rights.204
The Constitutional Court took the opportunity to reiterate the
government’s obligation to ensure access to abortion where consti-
tutionally protected under C-355/06. Perhaps in light of challenges
women continued to face in accessing abortion care services, the
court described the scope of the government’s obligation in
199 Id. at 59.
200 GUTTMACHER INST., MAKING ABORTION SERVICES ACCESSIBLE IN THE WAKE OF LE-
GAL REFORMS: A FRAMEWORK OF SIX CASE STUDIES 22 (2012), available at http://www.
guttmacher.org/pubs/abortion-services-laws.pdf; Davis, supra note 194, at 1681;
Ordolis, supra note 190, at 275. After the regulation was in force for nearly three
years, an anti-abortion coalition challenged the regulation and enforcement was sus-
pended in October 2009 based on a technical argument that the Constitutional
Court’s decision should be implemented by the legislature rather than the executive.
GUTTMACHER INST., at 24; Davis, supra note 194, at 1681 n.130.
201 Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 28, 2009 Sentencia T-
388/09 (Colom.), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/
T-388-09.htm (in Spanish).
202 Id. § 7.
203 Id. § 5.3.
204 Id. §§ 5.1, 5.2. The court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the scope of the
right to conscientious objection and stated that the right (1) is an individual right that
does not extend to health care institutions, (2) only applies to medical personnel who
are directly involved in the procedure and does not include individuals performing
preparatory tasks or providing post-treatment care, and (3) can only be asserted by
medical personnel where there is a guarantee that the woman can still access quality
and safe care without additional barriers. Id.
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greater detail. It stated that (1) women should have access to infor-
mation about their rights and the court’s decisions, (2) abortion
services should be available throughout the country at all levels of
care and sufficiently available in the public health network, and (3)
a woman cannot be denied access to constitutionally protected
abortion care because she does not have insurance or the ability to
pay for services.205 It also emphasized that obstacles or barriers to
constitutionally protected abortions are categorically prohibited.206
As part of its decision, the Constitutional Court ordered the
Ministries of Social Welfare and Education and the Attorney Gen-
eral and Public Defender to design and implement campaigns to
promote sexual and reproductive rights and increase awareness of
the court’s decisions. The court urged the government to monitor
the campaigns to assess their impact and effectiveness.207 It also
ordered the National Superintendent of Health to adopt measures
requiring that the entities that promote and provide health care
(whether public or private, secular or religious) employ enough
medical professionals to provide constitutionally protected abor-
tions and abstain from imposing impermissible requirements on
abortion access.208
3. Nepal Supreme Court: Dhikta v. Nepal
The Colombian Constitutional Court decisions provide
greater specificity about the scope of government affirmative obli-
gations to ensure access to abortion where constitutionally pro-
tected, requiring that the government affirmatively inform women
about their rights, ensure that adequate service providers are avail-
able, and prohibit health care institutions from imposing barriers
to abortion access. The decisions also articulate a principle that
services should be available on a basis of equality and should not be
denied for lack of ability to pay. In the 2009 decision Lakshmi
Dhikta v. Nepal, the Supreme Court of Nepal imposed similar obli-
gations to make information available and expand the availability
of service providers. Further, in addition to articulating the princi-
ple that services should be equally accessible, it articulates a gov-
ernment obligation to ensure that services are affordable.
In 2002, Lakshmi Dhikta sued the Nepalese government after
she was forced to continue an unwanted pregnancy and give birth
205 Id. § 4.4(ii), (iii), (vi), (vii).
206 Id. § 4.4 (viii).
207 Id. at Third, 22.
208 Id. at Fourth, 22.
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to a sixth child because she could not afford an abortion at a gov-
ernment health facility.209 The Dhikta case required the Nepalese
Supreme Court to consider the scope of a woman’s right to abor-
tion following the 2002 decriminalization of abortion and the
adoption of a provision in the Interim Constitution recognizing
that “every woman shall have the right to reproductive health and
rights relating to reproduction.”210 In its decision, the court af-
firmed that abortion is an important part of women’s reproductive
rights and recognized that reproductive health and rights are inte-
gral to women’s human rights to dignity, liberty and autonomy,
health, privacy, non-discrimination, freedom from cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment, freedom from sexual violence, and the
benefit from scientific progress.211
The Nepalese Supreme Court articulated a robust conception
of the fundamental rights protected by its constitution and an af-
firmative government obligation to ensure them. The court stated
that it is insufficient for fundamental rights to be merely declara-
tory. Instead, people must be able to benefit from the rights in
practice.212 The court infused its conception of rights with a strong
equality principle, asserting that rights cannot be confined to a par-
ticular class but rather must be equally enjoyed by all.213 The court
also articulated a commitment to ensuring access to abortion care
for poor and rural women.214
On the issue of affordability, the court emphasized that the
government had an obligation to ensure that no woman is denied a
legal abortion because she cannot pay for it.215 It stated that the
government should monitor the fees charged for abortion care
and set limits to ensure that fees charged take into account wo-
men’s ability to pay.216 It also instructed the government to con-
sider providing free services for women who cannot afford to
209 Melissa Upreti, Nepal Advances As U.S. Backslides on Women’s Rights, RH REALITY
CHECK (Mar. 1, 2011, 6:49 PM) http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2011/03/01/
nepal-takes-huge-step-women-rights-while-backslides.
210 INTERIM CONST. OF NEPAL 2063 (2007) § 20(2), Jan. 15, 2007, available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46badd3b2.html; Upreti, supra note 209.
211 Lakshmi Dhikta v. Nepal, Supreme Court of Nepal 2009, 6 (unofficial translation
on file with author).
212 Id. at 22.
213 Id. at 22, 23, 25, 26.
214 Id. at 23, 24.
215 CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, LAKSHMI DHIKTA V. NEPAL FACT SHEET, available at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Lakshmi%
20Dhikta%20Factsheet%20FINAL.PDF; Upreti, supra note 209.
216 Dhikta at 24–26.
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pay.217
A constitutional vision that focuses on whether people can en-
joy rights in practice requires more than “non-interference.” It im-
poses a government obligation to develop and adopt policies to
ensure rights. Consistent with high court decisions from other
countries,218 the court recognized its responsibility to ensure that
constitutional rights were both observed and implemented,219 but
emphasized that it is the government’s responsibility to establish
specific laws and policies to realize the rights.220 However, in addi-
tion to generally noting a government obligation to establish infra-
structure and monitoring procedures, the court highlighted
specific issues for the government to address, including providing
information about the decriminalization of abortion and the pro-
cedures to obtain services,221 increasing the number of health
workers and expanding their presence throughout the country,222
and taking measures to ensure that fees charged are reasonable
given women’s ability to pay, including setting fair rates.223 As a
general principle, the court stated that government policies should
distribute services according to the needs of the people.224 It em-
phasized the government’s efforts would be evaluated by whether
the individuals who need services are actually able to access
them.225
4. Affirmative Obligations to Ensure Access to Abortion
The ECHR, Colombian, and Nepalese decisions are notable
for the courts’ focus on results—whether or not women can exer-
cise their rights—rather than the adequacy or impropriety of gov-
ernment actions. Like the state abortion funding cases, the courts’
analysis is more contextual and less formalistic, focusing on the ac-
tual experience of women seeking services.226 The Colombian and
Nepalese courts also articulate a commitment to equality in acces-
217 Id. at 23–25.
218 See Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 36, at 1030–32 (describing cases where in
the absence of bad faith, courts may issue declarations or recommendations to en-
gage in a dialogic approach, which increases institutional competence, democratic
legitimacy, and the likelihood of robust enforcement)
219 Dhikta, at 26.
220 Id. at 11–12.
221 Id. at 26.
222 Id. at 11–12.
223 Id. at 22, 23.
224 Id. at 23, 25.
225 Id. at 22–24.
226 See supra Part II.D.2. See C-355/06 Translation, supra note 194, at 16–17 (noting
that illegal abortion is a serious public health problem that “primarily affects adoles-
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sing fundamental rights and to ensuring that all women, rich or
poor, have access to services227 that was notably absent in the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Harris v. McRae. Dhikta in particular rec-
ognizes that the government must address the issue of affordability
by setting fees and considering the provision of free services.
Applying Dhikta and the Colombian Constitutional Court’s
reasoning to the right to abortion in the United States would re-
quire that the government adopt policies to promote women’s abil-
ity to access abortion care instead of allowing the government to
adopt funding policies designed to discourage abortion. Recogniz-
ing an affirmative government obligation would require that gov-
ernment policies take steps to remove affordability as a barrier to
access for poor women rather than exploit their inability to afford
care through discriminatory health care funding and bans on the
provision of abortions in public facilities. Although courts impos-
ing affirmative government obligations to ensure rights have been
hesitant to require the adoption of specific policy measures, their
review typically will consider whether the government has adopted
policies that are reasonably crafted to ensure the protected right228
and find a violation where policies are designed to frustrate rather
than achieve that goal. The European Court of Human Rights has
stated that if a state recognizes a legal right to abortion it may not
“structure its legal framework in a way that would limit real pos-
sibilities to attain it.”229 Applying this standard, discriminatory ben-
efit programs that undermine affordability and laws that impose
obstacles to private insurance cannot be viewed as reasonable poli-
cies designed to ensure access to abortion. Similarly, reasonable
policies to fulfill the government’s affirmative obligations would re-
quire that the government work to improve access to abortion care
at public health facilities rather than prohibit it.
B. Government Neutrality: State Court Funding Decisions
R.R., the Colombian Constitutional Court cases, and Dhikta
provide the most expansive conception of government obligations
to ensure reproductive autonomy addressing many of the concerns
cents, displaced victims of internal armed conflict, and those with the lowest levels of
education and income”).
227 T-388/09, § 4.4(ii), (iii), (vii); Dhikta, at 22–26.
228 Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 36, at 1021; R.R. v. Poland, App. No. 27617/04,
¶¶ 213, 214 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011)(holding that Poland had failed to comply with its
affirmative obligations but stating that “it is not for this Court to indicate the most
appropriate means for the State to comply with its positive obligations”).
229 R.R. v. Poland ¶ 199.
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articulated by Professor Copelon and the reproductive justice
movement.230 However, courts have recognized that even absent
affirmative government obligations, there are constitutional limita-
tions to the government’s discretion to determine what it will or
will not fund. This approach was adopted by the state abortion
funding cases in rejecting Harris’s holding that a discriminatory
funding scheme cannot impose an unconstitutional obstacle.231 In-
stead, the state cases held that government funding programs can-
not impose conditions that discriminatorily burden the exercise of
a fundamental right or make invidious distinctions between classes
of citizens.232
While the state decisions continued to reject an affirmative ob-
ligation to ensure that women are able to access abortion ser-
vices,233 they held that when the government enacts a policy or
program conferring benefits it must allocate them in a neutral
230 See supra Part I.
231 Women of the State of Minn. by Doe v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 29–30 (Minn.
1995)(“[T]o the extent that McRae stands for the proposition that a legislative fund-
ing ban on abortion does not infringe on a woman’s right to abortion, we depart from
McRae.”); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 156 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1986) (“[E]xcepting from
the medicaid program of one single medical procedure which is absolutely necessary
to preserve the health of the woman . . . constitutes an infringement of the right of
privacy . . . under [the Connecticut constitution]”).
232 Moe v. Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 401 (Mass. 1981)(“While the
State retains wide latitude to decide the manner in which it will allocate benefits, it
may not use criteria which discriminatorily burden the exercise of a fundamental
right.”); State, Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc.,
28 P.3d 904, 910 (Alaska 2001)(stating that while the state “may legitimately attempt
to limit its expenditures . . . a State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious
distinctions between classes of its citizens”).
233 The state decisions uniformly emphasized their rejection of an affirmative gov-
ernment obligation to ensure that women can access abortion or other health care
services. Comm. To Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 780 (Cal.
1981)(“[T]he state has no constitutional obligation to provide medical care to the
poor.”); Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 28 (noting that plaintiffs arguments relied on the fact
that differential treatment interfered with women’s decision-making process rather
than a state obligation to fund the exercise of every constitutional right); Women’s
Health Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 666 (W. Va. 1993)(stating
that Appellees’ assertion that “the state is not obligated to pay for the exercise of
constitutional rights” was true); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 935 n.5 (N.J.
1982)(“[T]he right of the individual is freedom from undue government interfer-
ence, not an assurance of government funding”); Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care
Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28, 31–32 (Ariz. 2002)(“[W]e do not hold that Ari-
zona’s right of privacy entitles citizens to subsidized abortions.”); Alaska Dep’t of Health,
28 P.3d at 906 (stating that the issue is “not whether the state is generally obligated to
subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights for those who cannot otherwise afford
to do so”); Planned Parenthood Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Human Res. of State of Or.,
663 P.2d 1247, 1255 (Or. App. 1983).
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way.234
Thus, although the state does not have an obligation to fund
health care or a woman’s decision to exercise her right to have an
abortion, once the government takes on the obligation to fund
health care for the poor, it must not do so in a way that coerces
women’s procreative and reproductive health choices.235 The state
decisions held that the adoption of a discriminatory funding
scheme implicated fundamental rights, triggering heightened scru-
tiny under a privacy and due process analysis236 or an equal protec-
tion analysis.237  The Massachusetts Supreme Court wrote:
As an initial matter, the Legislature need not subsidize any of
the costs associated with child bearing, or with health care gen-
erally. However, once it chooses to enter the constitutionally
protected area of choice, it must do so with genuine indiffer-
ence. It may not weigh the options open to the pregnant woman
by its allocation of public funds; in this area, government is not
free to “achieve with carrots what [it] is forbidden to achieve
with sticks.”238
The Alaska Supreme Court similarly emphasized that “the underly-
234 See, e.g., Myers, 625 P.2d at 781 (contrasting the McRae Court’s holding that the
federal Constitution does not require justification for discriminatory treatment as
long as the program “placed no new obstacles in the path of the woman seeking to
exercise her constitutional right” with the California line of cases holding that dis-
crimination in government benefits requires strict scrutiny whether or not a new ob-
stacle is imposed); Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d at 666 (holding that the common benefit
clause of the state constitution imposes a neutrality requirement when the state pro-
vides a vehicle for the exercise of a constitutional right).
235 Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 27 (noting that the right to privacy includes the right to
control one’s own body and the right to procreation without state interference);
Maher, 515 A.2d at 152 (“[E]ven though the poverty of the plaintiff women was not
the state’s making and there may have been no constitutional obligation to pay for
the medical treatment for the poor, once the state has chosen to do so it must pre-
serve neutrality.”).
236 Maher, 515 A.2d at 156–57 (applying strict scrutiny); Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 31
(applying strict scrutiny); Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 404 (applying a balancing test).
237 Although each of the courts found that heightened scrutiny was required given
the nature of the right at issue, consistent with their state equal protection jurispru-
dence, they applied slightly different tests. See, e.g., Simat Corp., 56 P.3d at 32 (applying
strict scrutiny analysis because of the fundamental right in question); Byrne, 450 A.2d
at 934 (applying a balancing test); Alaska Dep’t of Health, 28 P.3d at 909 (holding that
Alaska’s sliding scale review requires strict scrutiny when the exercise of a constitu-
tional right is involved); Maher, 515 A.2d at 159 (ruling that because of the fundamen-
tal right at issue the state “must establish both a compelling state interest [. . .] and
that no less restrictive alternative is available”); Dep’t of Human Res. of State of Or., 663
P.2d at 1247 (applying a test balancing the “detriment to affected members of the
class [. . .] against the state’s ostensible justification for the disparate treatment”).
238 Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 402 (quoting LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 933 n.77 (1978)); Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d at 666; Maher, 515 A.2d at 153;
Simat Corp., 56 P.3d at 36.
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ing logic” of all the state cases is that “when state government seeks
to act for the common benefit, protection, and security of the peo-
ple in providing medical care for the poor, it has an obligation to
do so in a neutral manner so as not to infringe upon the constitu-
tional rights of our citizens.”239
The neutrality principle espoused in these decisions looks at
the overall impact of the funding scheme rather than focusing on
the decision not to fund. The Minnesota Supreme Court wrote that
the right to privacy protects a “woman’s decision to abort” and that
“any legislation infringing on the decision-making process . . . vio-
lates this fundamental right.”240 The cases reject Harris’s arbitrary
distinction between coercive government acts that burden the ex-
ercise of a right and coercive allocation of benefits to fund govern-
ment preferences where women do not have the means to fund
another choice.241 Justice Brennan expressed this view in his dis-
sent in Harris:
The fundamental flaw in the Court’s due process analysis . . . is
its failure to acknowledge that the discriminatory distribution of
benefits of governmental largesse can discourage the exercise of
fundamental liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial
of those rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions.242
Applying the neutrality principle articulated by the state cases
and the dissent in the Harris decision, current law allowing the fed-
eral and state governments to use Medicaid benefits to coerce wo-
men’s reproductive health and procreative decisions would be
impermissible.
C. Freedom from Government Prohibitions on Private Health
Insurance: Chaoulli v. Quebec
As discussed above, current U.S. abortion funding restrictions
would violate affirmative government obligations to ensure that wo-
239 Alaska Dep’t of Health, 28 P.3d at 908 (quoting Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d at 667); see
also Myers, 625 P.2d at 781; Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 28; Byrne, 450 A.2d at 937; N.M.
Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841, 856 (N.M. 1998); Simat Corp., 56
P.3d at 36 (noting a consistency in cases “in the view that funding bans that discrimi-
nate against abortions medically necessary only to preserve the health of indigent
women were unsustainable once the state had undertaken to provide medically neces-
sary care”).
240 Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 31.
241 Alaska Dep’t of Health, 28 P.3d at 909 (“Judicial scrutiny of state action is equally
strict where the government by selectively denying a benefit to those who exercise a
constitutional right, effectively deters the exercise of that right.”).
242 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 333–34 (1980)(Brennan, J., dissenting), cited by
Gomez, 542 N.W.2d at 24, 29.
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men have meaningful access to abortion under developing interna-
tional standards articulated by international bodies and the high
courts in Colombia and Nepal. Even absent the recognition of af-
firmative government obligations, the funding restrictions violate a
constitutional standard that requires government neutrality as held
by the U.S. state court decisions. The new state legislation banning
private insurance for abortion arguably poses even greater consti-
tutional problems by creating a government obstacle to individu-
als’ ability to access private health care.
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada found that a prohibi-
tion on private health insurance violated the right to life, personal
security, inviolability, and freedom under section 1 of the Quebec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Chaoulli v. Quebec in-
volved a challenge to a Quebec statute that prohibited the
purchase of private health insurance for services covered by the
public health care system.243 The legislation was adopted to pre-
serve the integrity of the public health care system244 and did not
reflect any policy against the provision of a specific type of service.
Notably, Quebec only prohibited the purchase of private health
care insurance.245 Individuals in need of health services could still
purchase the services directly without insurance coverage.246 They
could also access health services through the public health system,
but would be subject to lengthy waits.
A majority of four justices found that the law violated the Que-
bec Charter’s analogue to Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which provides for the right to “life, liberty
and security of the person.” Three of the justices also found that
the provision violated Section 7247 of the Canadian Charter based
on the denial of “the right to access alternative health care”248 and
243 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.C. 35 (Can.). For further
discussion of Chaoulli, see Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 36, at 1058–59; Hill, supra
note 103, at 527.
244 Chaoulli, 1 S.C.C. at 45.
245 Id. at 66–67.
246 Id.
247 Canadian courts generally interpret Section 7 to impose negative obligations
rather than positive duties to provide health care. Mel Cousins, Health Care and
Human Rights After Auton and Chaoulli, 54 MCGILL L.J. 717, 737 (2009) (“[T]he
courts have, to date, taken a limited view of Chaoulli and have not been prepared to
adopt the somewhat expansive approach of that judgment so as to impose positive
duties on the state in the area of health care under section 7 of the Charter.”); Joanna
N. Erdman, In the Back Alleys of Health Care: Abortion, Equality, and Community in Ca-
nada, 56 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1110 (2007).
248 Chaoulli, 1 S.C.C. at 84 (McLachlin, C.J., and Major & Bastarache, J.J.,
concurring).
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the “loss of control by an individual over [his or] her own
health.”249
The concurring opinion found that the ban limited “access to
private health services by removing the ability to contract for pri-
vate health care insurance.”250 Although private services were avail-
able, the justices found that as a practical matter most individuals
rely upon health insurance to cover health expenses and that as a
result of the ban only the very rich would have access to private
health care and that most Quebecers would be subject to lengthy
delays resulting in adverse physical and psychological conse-
quences.251 The majority opinion similarly found that the ability to
obtain private health care without insurance was “almost illusory”
because “[t]he prohibition on private insurance creates an obstacle
that is practically insurmountable for people with average
incomes.”252
Applying the Canadian concept that the right to personal invi-
olability and security prohibits government restrictions that under-
mine individuals’ ability to access health care, current state law
bans on private insurance that prevent women from accessing
abortion care by prohibiting health insurance coverage would be
impermissible. Although the Supreme Court has not held that the
right to privacy encompasses the right to be free from government
obstacles in accessing health care,253 some state courts have
adopted a view similar to the Canadian Supreme Court that the
right to privacy and personal security may include the right to pre-
serve and protect one’s health.254
Although the approaches adopted by the high courts in other
countries and the state courts that have struck down Medicaid
funding restrictions diverge from current Supreme Court jurispru-
249 Id. at 85.
250 Id. at 66–67.
251 Id. at 66–68.
252 Id. at 45.
253 But see Hill, supra note 103, at 531–37 (arguing that the “right to make medical
treatment decisions without government interference—run[s] through a long line of
Supreme Court and lower court cases.”  Although the “negative constitutional right to
health” is not explicitly referred to as the basis for a Supreme Court holding “it is a
strain that intersects and overlaps with other rights in a wide range of substantive due
process cases.”). Id. at 531.
254 Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 151 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1986); Right to Choose v.
Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 934 (N.J. 1982)(citing Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 70 A. 314
(N.J. 1908), for the proposition that, “[a]mong the most [important] of personal
rights, without which a man could not live in a state of society, is the right of personal
security, including ‘the preservation of a man’s health from such practices as may
prejudice or annoy it’”).
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dence, they provide a possible road-map for future arguments to
change and advance the law at the state or federal level. They also
provide a normative framework for a more robust concept of re-
productive rights that can be used in legislative and political advo-
cacy and grassroots organizing and mobilization. The concept of a
government obligation to ensure that women can access their
rights can be used to encourage public dialogue around the ques-
tions asked by the Supreme Court of Nepal: are services affordable
and accessible and if not, what should the government be doing to
make them so? This dialogue would support efforts to beat back
existing abortion funding restrictions, but would also support the
creation of government programs to address other structural barri-
ers that prevent women from accessing reproductive health ser-
vices. At a more modest level, the concept of government
neutrality could support efforts to prohibit discriminatory health
care coverage in both public health care and the private insurance
market.255
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s abortion funding cases allowed the fed-
eral government to use Medicaid funding to create, as a practical
matter, a different set of rights for the rich and the poor. Ironi-
cally, rather than expanding insurance coverage for medically nec-
essary abortions, health care reform is likely to result in the largest
expansion of the Hyde restrictions since the amendment went into
affect in 1977. These restrictions will not only affect low income
women who receive health care coverage from the federal govern-
ment, but will also be extended to women who buy their own
health insurance through the new insurance exchanges and on the
private market.
In the 1980s, the reproductive rights movement failed to suffi-
ciently mobilize in response to the abortion funding cases. The fail-
ure to challenge the Supreme Court’s conception of reproductive
choice as a negative right or its assertion that Congress had the
255 Laura Bassett, Reproductive Parity Act: Washington Considers Groundbreaking Abor-
tion Rights Law, HUFFINGTON POST POLITICS (Jan. 13, 2012, 5:02 PM) available at http:/
/www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/13/washington-abortion-reproductive-parity-act
_n_1205415.html. An example of legislation inspired by the neutrality principle is the
Reproductive Parity Act, introduced in Washington State in 2012. Id. Although it
failed to pass, the Act would have required that every insurance policy that covered
maternity care also cover abortion. Id. Sponsors described the bill as an attempt to
ensure that the implementation of the ACA does not undermine women’s abortion
coverage. Id.
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discretion to manipulate Medicaid health benefits to coerce poor
women’s reproductive health decision-making and procreative au-
tonomy paved the way for increased abortion restrictions in the
1990s and the current legislative attempts to impose abortion in-
surance restrictions on all women.
Because current state laws banning private insurance coverage
for abortion services do not constitute “public funding restrictions”
allowed under Harris v. McRae, courts may hold that they are un-
constitutional under the improper purpose prong of the undue
burden standard. However, prohibiting private insurance bans is
only a step toward “winning back what we have lost.” The Supreme
Court’s abortion funding cases opened the door to the use of gov-
ernment programs to coerce women’s reproductive health and
procreative decision-making based on the formalistic distinction
that government funding allocations do not create new obstacles
for poor women who seek an abortion. Casey went further, holding
that states can impose an obstacle as long as it does not have the
purpose or effect of creating a substantial obstacle. These stan-
dards have resulted in a steady stream of legislation and restrictions
designed to whittle away women’s access to abortion services, to
create a right under the law that is not accessible in fact.
Although the neutrality standard adopted by the state courts
that struck down Medicaid funding restrictions would be a step in
the right direction, a woman’s right to reproductive autonomy can-
not be truly protected absent legal and political recognition that
the government has an affirmative obligation to ensure her rights.
This standard would require that the government adopt programs
to support a woman’s right to have an abortion and prohibit poli-
cies designed to coerce her decisions or to thwart her ability to
exercise her rights.
